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This study examined faculty behavior under merit 
pay Plans at four liberal arts colleges to determine 
whether there was a relationship between faculty 
motivation (effort) and the degree to which 
institutional pay plans and individual expectancies 
conformed to Lawler's theory of the conditions 
necessary for an effective monetary incentive structure 
(Lawler 1971, 1981, 1990). These conditions are: 1) A 
perception that performance and merit awards are 
linked; 2) Monetary rewards are highly valued; 3) Award 
size is large enough to make an impact; and 4) 
Information about rewards are publicly disclosed. The 
study proposed the question: Is there an association 
between motivation levels among faculty subject to 
merit pay plans and the presence of the theory 
conditions, or do other factors relate to faculty 
motivation? Using questionnaires to faculty, 
statistical correlation techniques tested for 
associations between reported faculty behavior and 
Lawler's four theory conditions. 
Lawler's theory did not apply to this group of 
faculty. The reward size condition showed the expected 
positive association, however, contrary to theory 
hypothesis, the perception of the pay-performance link 
was negatively related. Of the faculty characteristics 
examined, faculty with higher salaries and those with 
tenure reported less willingness to give additional 
effort to most activities. 
The faculty had highly inaccurate perceptions of 
the actual merit payments awarded to others at their 
institutions. The perception of the strength of the 
pay-performance link indicated that faculty believe the 
determination of reward recipients is unpredictable 
with respect to one's performance. These faculty 
members valued monetary rewards, yet responses to merit 
pay in the form of greater effort was weak. The 
stronger response to merit pay by the faculty at the 
non-merit pay institution suggests that familiarity 
with a merit pay system in practice breeds a more 
skeptical attitude because it has not proven as 
equitable or fruitful in operation as the faculty 
expect in the abstract. 
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NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
Money is important to most people and therefore 
has the potential to influence behavior. Many 
organizations, relying on this assumption, attempt to 
link pay to performance in an effort to motivate 
employees to increase work quality and productivity or 
to influence the direction of work. The fundamental 
concept behind merit pay, or pay-for-performance, is 
that by rewarding an individual with additional income, 
the organization encourages and recognizes success 
while highlighting exemplary behavior to be emulated by 
others in the organization. Little or no merit 
increment also sends a message to employees about 
organizational priorities, and provides an incentive 
for individuals to improve (Miller 1988). Merit pay 
also has a broader purpose as part of an institution's 
overall compensation scheme that can attract, develop, 
and retain high performing employees (Hansen 1988). 
Although merit pay for faculty is a relatively 
common reward mechanism at colleges and universities, 
the forms merit pay plans take and the results of such 
plans vary widely, depending on the goals of the plan, 
the environment in which it operates, and the nature of 
1 
the group covered by the plan. Common objectives 
behind merit pay are to improve the quality and level 
of output of faculty performance in general, and to 
influence, through the terms of the reward system, the 
choices faculty make about the mix of time and effort 
they allocate among research, teaching, and service. 
In short, the fundamental purpose of merit pay is to 
motivate faculty to behave in a certain way. 
This study examined faculty behavior under merit 
pay plans at specific institutions to see whether the 
faculty exhibited the characteristics of motivation as 
suggested by Lawler' s theory of effective incentive pay 
plans (Lawler 1971, 1981, 1990). Lawler prescribed 
four conditions that must prevail for merit pay to 
motivate performance. A long history of research in 
motivation has produced numerous theories to explain 
employee behavior. Lawler' s theory is based on a 
widely accepted body of research that attempts to 
understand the process that creates motivation. This 
so-called "expectancy theory" is built around how 
people are motivated. 
The mere implementation of a merit pay plan does 
not necessarily result in the desired behavior. 
Numerous considerations regarding the implementation of 
merit pay plans and the organizational environment 
2 
affect the degree to which employees will respond to 
the incentive. Organizations often do not implement 
merit pay systems according to established theory or 
adapt the plan to function under the unique 
characteristics of the institution. Pay practices are 
usually implemented, not as a result of research, but 
based on the personal preferences or opinions of a · few 
people and are heavily influenced by chance and 
circumstance as well as by the policies of other 
organizations (Lawler 1971). Because many institutions 
already have merit pay plans and others frequently 
contemplate implementing one, an important question is 
not simply whether these incentives motivate or are 
effective, but rather under what c onditions are they 
effective? 
Faculty offer a unique case to study the 
conditions of merit pay incentives. Their motivations 
are tied more to the intellectual rewards of their 
profession than to the monetary goals that drive 
workers in other sectors (Tuckman 1976). Faculty 
members tend to be more motivated by intrinsic rewards, 
such as the intellectual stimulation of research and 
satisfaction from interaction with students (McKeachie 
1979). Some skeptics question whether merit pay is 
even appropriate or effective for faculty because, in 
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addition to their presumed preference for intrinsic 
rewards, monetary incentives might divert faculty from 
what is considered important in academia--the pursuit 
and advancement of knowledge (McKeachie 1979). This 
does not necessarily mean, however, that faculty are 
not or should not be motivated by monetary rewards. 
Pay is only one of many avenues for motivating college 
faculty, and under some circumstances, not always the 
most powerful. It may be true that faculty do not 
respond as strongly to monetary rewards as people in 
other professions, but that does not mean that the 
prospect of additional monetary compensation will not 
change behavior. 
Despite the ideals behind the goals of merit pay, 
there is widespread dissatisfaction with merit pay 
plans for several reasons. Merit pay assumes that 
supervisors can make valid, objective evaluations 
(Meyer 197 5) . Because 





differences of opinion about whether achievement and 
performance are actually rewarded are commonplace. The 
lack of clearly stated criteria that define merit may 
send mixed signals to faculty, and create confusion 
about institutional priorities. Under these conditions 
merit pay could become counterproductive as an 
4 
incentive. Those faculty who do not receive merit 
awards may view the pay plan as punishment, especially 
when (as is often the case for financially strapped 
institutions today) basic cost of living increases have 
not been provided for everyone. For some, the 
psychological impact of being denied merit could create 
insecurities and a sense of limitations placed on 
freedom of job behavior. 
Some theorists argue that individuals overestimate 
their overall performance, as well as their 
overvaluation of those performance criteria at which 
they excel. Consequently, people will typically think 
that they deserve more than they received and thus they 
feel "cheated" and unmotivated by the raises they do 
receive (Meyer 1975). Thus, perceptions of unfairness 
and feelings of mistrust in the allocation of merit pay 
may lead to the erosion of collegiality and morale. 
For these reasons, an understanding of the conditions 
under which merit pay plans are implemented can 
contribute to more effective and acceptable pay plans 
that avoid the perceptions that lead to these types of 
problems. 
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While monetary incentive systems can be difficult 
and time- c onsuming to implement, and their effects on 
behavior are often uncertain, they can offer important 
benefits. Incentives such as merit pay, rather than a 
restrictive system of rules and regulations, can 
provide a more flexible approach to encourage desired 
behavior. Due to the complexity of evaluating the 
direct effect of incentives on behavior and the lack of 
objective measures of 
difficult for college 
faculty performance, it is 
administrators to determine 
whether the incentives being offered are actually 
achieving the desired behavior from faculty (Tuckman 
1976) . Despite the claims that merit reward systems 
are misplaced in faculty settings (McKeachie 1979, 
Meyer 1975), it can be argued that academics should be 
evaluated for purposes of accountability. Recognizing 
superior performance is as much a legitimate part of 
higher education as it is in other professions (Hansen 
1988). 
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OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
This study used one theory of pay and motivation 
to examine faculty behavior under merit pay systems at 
ins ti tut ions of higher education. The theoretical 
basis for the study was research conducted by Lawler 
(1971, 1981, 1990). His theory was selected because it 
is widely accepted by the large body of motivational 
research, and has been confirmed in Beer et al. (1984). 
Lawler suggested that in order for a merit pay system 
to motivate employees, four conditions must prevail in 
an organization: 
1. Individuals must believe that there is 
actually a link between merit pay and good 
performance. 
2. Individuals must place a high level of 
importance on monetary compensation. 
3. The size of the awards must be large enough 
to make a difference in behavior. 
4. If the pay system does in fact reward good 
performance and is perceived as such by 
employees (#1), the recipients of awards and 
award size should be disclosed to the 
relevant members of the workforce. 
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Since there are important differences among 
faculty at different types of institutions, the study 
focused on institutions of similar organizational 
characteristics and mission. The pool for this study 
included independent liberal arts colleges that 
responded to a large survey of merit pay and market 
place differentials conducted by the National Center 
for Postsecondary Governance and Finance (NCPGF) . 1 
Within this group, the specific institutions 
investigated to test the theory were selected so as to 
include institutions that conformed to the theory to 
varying degrees. Three institutions selected for in-
depth study had faculty merit pay plans and one did 
not . Within each college, specific departments were 
selected to obtain a sample size of approximately 30 
percent of the institution's faculty. 
1 In the summer of 1990, the National Center for 
Postsecondary Governance and Finance (NCPGF) surveyed 
by mail the chief academic officers (CAOs) at 500 
randomly selected institutions (100 from each of five 
Carnegie categories--Research I&II, Doctoral Granting 
I&II, Comprehensive I&II, Liberal Arts I&II, and Two 
Year) on merit pay and salary differentials caused by 
market place pressures. After one follow-up, CAOs 
returned 320 surveys. Ten of the original sample were 
disqualified (N=490) bringing the overall response rate 
to 65%. Additionally, nine surveys were unusable, so 
the total included in the analysis included 311 
completed questionnaires. In the survey, 54% of the 
colleges and universities were state supported. The 




The major questions the study sought to answer 
1. Is there a correlation between motivation 
levels among faculty subject to merit pay plans 
and the presence or absence of the conditions 
required to motivate as stated in Lawler's 
theory? 
2. Are there other factors beyond Lawler's theory 
that relate to motivation levels among faculty 
under various pay plans? 
IMPORTANCE AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE RESEARCH 
The financial resources devoted to salaries 
represent two-thirds or more of annual university 
budgets (Keller 1983) . Given that significant claim on 
institutional resources, the pay system's effectiveness 
should be a high priority for administrators. Although 
higher education espouses a long tradition of awarding 
pay for good performance, the discussion has 
intensified as salaries, institutional reputations, 
productivity, and faculty retention and recruitment 
have become increasingly important to the maintenance 
of financial health and academic quality of 
9 
institutions. Merit pay has become one instrument for 
meeting these challenges. 
It is significant that this study investigated 
merit pay with relation to faculty motivation rather 
than general compensation levels. In theory, it is the 
changes in compensation that merit pay awards produce, 
rather than total pay levels, that motivate employees 
(Lawler 1990). This study investigated whether the 
specific conditions under which a merit pay plan 
operates are related to faculty behavior in terms of 
the level and direction of -effort as self-reported by 
faculty. 
Pay and motivation have been widely studied in the 
industrial sector, but merit pay and its motivational 
powers have not been extensively addressed in higher 
education. Certainly, faculty exhibit a different set 
of values and motivations than the typical business 
organization, the most common environment for pay and 
motivation studies. 
Faculty present particular challenges for studies 
of compensation because of the nature of their output . 
The quality of knowledge and intellectual output are 
not easily evaluated to determine merit . Measures of 
good teaching have long been elusive and subjective 
(Seldin 1984). Of all faculty activity, research is 
10 
, 
probably the most straightforward to evaluate in 
quantitative terms such as output level, grants 
procured, and publications. Yet even here, gauging 
quality is far more difficult than gauging quantity. 
Other factors besides research productivity contribute 
to the complexity of making equitable evaluations. The 
differences among disciplines in research 
opportunities, grant availability, and the quality of 
research make uniform approaches to evaluation 
Some fields are more adaptable to clear inappropriate. 
measures of output than are others where potentially 
equally meritorious research takes place. The results 
of research in the hard sciences, for example, may be 
more often objectively measured and evaluated than the 
research produced by social scientists. 
The objective of this study, however, was not to 
address the problems of evaluating faculty performance; 
rather it was to determine whether self-reported 
faculty effort relates in any way to the type of merit 
pay plan in operation. This study was based largely on 
expectancy theory because expectations are what dictate 
motivation. The university can exert some influence 
over faculty expectations about monetary rewards 
through its incentive plan and the message the plan 
sends to faculty about expected behavior. In addition 
11 
to the way institutions implement their merit pay 
plans, a primary basis of the study was f lt acu y 
perceptions of merit pay rewards at their institutions. 
These perceptions are important in determining the 
success of such systems. Individuals' interpretations 
of situations affect behavior, and faculty 
misinterpretation of the administration's objectives 
behind merit pay plans can cause the reward system to 
fail (McKeachie 1979). 
Examining the external rewards, those tangible 
rewards conferred by the institution, can help 
determine whether particular merit pay plan conditions 
affect faculty behavior. 
STATUS OF MERIT PAY IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 
The NCPGF survey of academic officers revealed 
that most agree that issues of merit pay are more 
difficult to resolve than other governance matters. 
The survey investigated faculty compensation through 
COLA' s (cost-of-living adjustments), merit pay, and 
bonuses during 1989-90. The results showed that merit 
pay is widely used among colleges and universities 
(59%), but that the limited availability of funds for 
merit awards and faculty dissatisfaction with the 
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distribution of awards may be lessening the desired 
impact of the incentive. 
Public institutions of all types, and independent 
research universities and doctoral-granting 
institutions are the predominant users of merit pay . 
The amount of money allocated to merit by the surveyed 
institutions was not, however, a significant percentage 
of the total salary pool. At over 70 % of the 
institutions 5% or less of the total increase in 
compensation was set aside for merit pay. 
earmarked 3% or less for merit. 
Over half 
Whether the more effective approach to motivation 
is to make large awards to few people (as suggested by 
Lawler) or smaller sums to many, can be debated, but 
the dominant practice among the surveyed institutions 
was the latter. The average merit increase in 1989-90 
was 2-4% of base salary and fully two-thirds of the 
faculty received some level of merit pay. The overall 
range of merit increments awarded to faculty members, 
though less than 1% in many cases to higher than 25 % in 
rare instances, tended to be quite narrow at most 
institutions, which would, according to Lawler's 
theory, weaken the motivational impact of merit pay. 
One-fifth of the surveyed institutions reported that 
the highest merit award was 5 % or less. Nearly an 
13 
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equal number of institutions, however, reported that 
the highest merit award was over 20%. 
Lawler contends that under a pay-for-performance 
system where employees see a clear link between good 
performance and merit pay, public disclosure of salary 
information can positively influence motivation. Both 
the potential to gain positive public recognition for 
one's performance and the model for exemplary behavior 
revealed can act as motivators. It appeared from the 
survey that the trend among colleges and universities 
is toward limited disclosure. During 1989-90, 45% of 
the surveyed administrators disclosed the average COLA 
increment to faculty, and only 32% revealed the average 
COLA plus merit increment. Aside from public 
institutions legally required to report salaries, only 
a small minority of the institutions surveyed disclosed 
information such as the highest and lowest merit 
awards, or the actual salaries and identities of merit 
recipients. 
The survey revealed that chief academic officers 
(CAO's) were generally supportive of merit pay plans 
for faculty. Eighty-two percent of the respondents 
agreed that faculty should have a merit pay plan. 
Many of the respondents appeared uncertain, however, 





productivity. Most CAOs (57%), primarily from large 
research and doctoral granting institutions, believed 
that merit pay makes faculty more productive, but 
nearly one-third had no opinion. About one-third of 
the respondents agreed that release time would be a 
better stimulant for productivity than merit pay or 
bonuses, but again, a significant portion (29%) neither 
agreed nor disagreed with that view. 
While faculty input to the merit distribution 
process was strongly supported by the CAOs, fewer 
agreed that such information should be publicly 
disclosed to faculty colleagues. Although 53% of CAOs 
felt that faculty should have a voice in determining 
who gets merit pay once the overall merit pool is 
established, only 29% of respondents said that their 
faculty always have a say in the distribution of merit. 
Over half of the respondents believed that institutions 
should not disclose individual salaries to the faculty, 
though this belief was expressed predominantly by CAOs 
from independent institutions. 
Given the high level of concern about merit pay 
issues expressed by the academic officers, approaches 
to dealing with faculty salary incentives are likely to 
remain a major focus of administrative concerns. This 
study addressed some of the conditions under which 
15 
merit pay plans function that theory suggests can 




DESIGN OF THE RESEARCH 
This study examined whether faculty at selected 
colleges with merit pay plans that conform with varying 
degree to Lawler's theory of motivational reward 
systems exhibit the behavioral characteristics 
suggested by the theory. The levels of faculty 
motivation at three institutions with merit pay plans 
were tested for association to the four conditions 
Lawler's theory deems necessary for pay to motivate. 
The assessment of faculty motivation was inferred from 
faculty perceptions provided in response to a survey 
questionnaire. The findings addressed the validity of 
the theory and whether faculty behavior differed among 
institutions that conformed in varying degrees to 
Lawler's theory. Additionally, an institution without 
a merit pay plan was studied to examine whether faculty 
behavior responses to incentives differed from faculty 
subject to merit pay. 
LOGIC OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
Lawler's theory of pay and motivation was tested 
in specific cases. The case study approach is a 
research tool that involves an intensive investigation 
17 





the testing of 
of the need to 
The scope of this 
the theory to a few 




reported behavior of specific faculty groups. The 
selection of a non-merit pay institution along with 
cases which represented differences among the merit pay 
plans provided a sharper analysis of the impact of the 
theory conditions. 
Often the objective of a case study is to 
generalize about a particular phenomenon to a larger 
population beyond the particular case study. The case 
study may also be used, as in this instance, for the 
specific application and test of a theory (Yin 1984). 
Yin described the advantages of using case studies to 
generalize to a theory rather than a population; the 
data are analyzed to see if it reveals what one would 
expect from the theory (Yin 1984). Examining specific 
cases not only tests Lawler' s theory, but the case 
study approach also allows for the discovery of other 
conditions or attributes of pay plans that motivate 
faculty. 
Critical to valid case study results is "instance" 
selection (U.S. GAO 1987). 
which cases (instances) 
The initial population from 
were selected for study 
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required a group of institutions similar in mission and 
organization in order to minimize the differences in 
factors other than merit pay and faculty work 
preferences that may affect faculty behavior . This 
consistency permitted more meaningful comparisons of 
faculty behavior between institutions . 
The Carnegie classification system of colleges and 
universities provides an appropriate categorization of 
institutions by type. The classifications include 
Research Universities (Level I and Level II), Doctoral-
Granting Universities ( I and II)' Comprehensive 
Colleges and Universities (I and II), Liberal Arts 
Colleges (I and II) and Two-Year Institutions . For 
purposes of this study the population selected was 
Liberal Arts I and II institutions. 2 Their relatively 
small size, the homogeneity across institutions, and 
the balance in their emphasis on teaching, research and 
service made for a cleaner application of the tested 
theory. Equally important, independent colleges have 
more direct control over pay policy than do many public 
institutions . 
2The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education 
defines Liberal Arts I and II institutions as primarily 
undergraduate colleges that award more than half of 
baccalaureate degrees in the arts and sciences fields. 
Liberal Arts I and Liberal Arts II differ in their 
degree of selectivity. 
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The targeted population of liberal arts 
institutions with merit pay plans was derived from the 
responses to the NCPGF compensation survey. In 
addition, the choice of institutions with pay plans 
that had been in place for several years ensured that 
faculty members were accustomed to the plan. Four 
institutions (three with merit pay plans, one without) 
were ultimately selected for study using a purposive 
sampling approach (U.S. GAO 1987). (Probability, or 
random sampling, is rarely used in case study 
approaches.) Purposive sampling allows the researcher 
to select units that appear to be representative of the 
population (Nachmias and Nachmias 1987). To address 
the study's research question, it was appropriate to 
examine two institutions, one with a relatively broad 
and one with a relatively narrow range of merit 
increment sizes (one of the theory conditions) The 
theory holds that this approach produces the greatest 
outcome (behavior) differences, absent any other 
intervening factors. A third institution that 
represented a level of conformance to theory at a point 
between the wide and narrow ranges was selected to 
examine whether faculty behavior 
that parallelled the degree of 
followed a pattern 
conformity to the 
theory. The award range criteria used to select an 
20 
initial sample pool was extracted from the NCPGF 
survey. 
Finally, a fourth institution, one without any 
merit pay plan, was included in order to compare that 
faculty's motivational characteristics with their 
counterparts at colleges with merit pay. In this way, 
the study would analyze whether other motivational 
factors might be at work if, despite the absence of any 
merit pay, faculty on this campus were highly 
motivated. 
In order to select the four study institutions, 
letters of inquiry to participate in the study were 
sent to 25 Liberal Arts colleges that had indicated in 
their response to the NCPGF survey that they had a 
faculty merit pay plan. This group of colleges was 
selected on the basis of the size of the range of merit 
awards that were granted as reported in the NCPGF 
survey. In order to test Lawler's theory in a way that 
permitted varying degrees of conformancy to the theory, 
the size of the merit pay range was one condition that 
could be initially determined. Thus, approximately 
equal numbers of institutions with relatively wide and 
narrow merit award ranges, and those somewhere in 
between were sent letters of inquiry to participate. 
Of the Liberal Arts colleges that indicated no merit 
21 
..... 
pay plans in the NCPGF survey, ten were chosen at 
random to inquire about study participation. 
Of the 25 institutions with merit pay, eight 
colleges responded positively to participating in the 
study. The institution with the widest range of merit 
awards and the one with narrowest range were selected 
as cases for this study. A third institution was 
selected whose merit pay range fell between these two. 
Of the ten institutions without merit pay plans that 
were approached for study participation, three 
responded positively. The college with the most 
faculty members was chosen for this study in order to 
increase the probability of a larger sample size. 
The faculty targeted for study within each 
selected institution were confined to three specific 
departments (English, Mathematics, and History) in 
order to limit the sample size and to provide an 
element of consistency to the analysis. Fenker (1977) 
suggested that a robust response from smaller units 
(e.g., academic departments) is preferable to modest 
responses across an entire institution in order to 
resolve response bias problems. The departments for 
this study were selected because they tend to be the 
larger departments in most colleges. In one case, two 
additional departments were used to achieve the desired 
22 
sample size. In another, an alternative department was 
used because the requested department for study 
consisted primarily of new faculty who had yet to be 
exposed to the merit pay plan. The relevant data on 
faculty behavior were gathered from a questionnaire 
designed for this study (see Appendix II) and 
distributed to faculty at the four selected 
institutions. The measurement of faculty behavior 
(motivation) required in this study was obviously not 
accessible to the researcher's direct observation, so 
the data had to be collected by self-reported responses 
from the faculty. The departmental questionnaire 
responses constituted the data used to answer the 
research questions. 
Surveys and questionnaires are used for 
descriptive, explanatory and exploratory purposes, 
chiefly in studies that have individuals as the units 
of analysis (Babbie 1983) · An investigation of the 
population of faculty in all colleges and universities 
would be far beyond the scope of this study. The case 
approach at a few 
institutions, along with 
to the respective faculties, provided questionnaires 
the best method to obtain original data on a population 
too large to observe directly. 
23 
In addition to the obvious advantages of cost and 
time, written questionnaires allowed assurances of 
anonymity for faculty, an especially important 
consideration on an issue as sensitive as compensation. 
Additionally, the types of questions asked were more 
conducive to written responses, both because of the 
greater level of comfort in responding anonymously to 
specific questions about personal behavior and the 
opportunity to provide more thoughtful and considered, 
rather than immediate, answers (Nachmias and Nachmias 
1987) . While the inability to obtain observed or 
experimental data is often viewed as a weakness of 
surveys, for the purposes of this study, the reliance 
on expectancy-based data made the questionnaire 
approach preferable as it was the best way to obtain 
faculty perceptions about the merit pay systems and the 
respondents' self-reported behavior. A key element of 
Lawler's theory is how workers perceive the pay plan. 
Because the research questions focused on 
relationships between faculty motivation to behave and 
conditions of the merit pay plans, a method of testing 
whether such a relationship existed was required. The 
faculty members' perceptions of behavior had to be 
scored in quantitative terms and such measures were 
therefore developed. The hypotheses of the study were 
24 
then tested through statistical association measures. 
The analysis did not require that a causal relationship 
exist, since the goal was to test the existence of 
certain behavioral patterns under a theoretical 
assumption. A correlation analysis was adequate and 
appropriate for investigating the relationship. 
Correlation design (or cross-sectional study), a 
common design employed in the social sciences, is often 
identified with survey research (Nachmias and Nachmias 
1987). Cross-tabulation techniques allowed further 
association tests beyond the motivation variables 
(e.g., demographics) to be examined by showing the 
cases where similar behavior patterns were associated 
with individual faculty characteristics, such as rank 
and salary level. 
The descriptive associations provided by the 
correlation and cross-tabulation analyses did not 
attempt to show causation because of the absence of 
enough conclusive information that one event preceded 
another (i.e., that the particular merit pay plan 
produced the expressed level of motivation) . The 
purpose of this study was to determine whether there 
was a systematic pattern of association between 
conformance to Lawler's theory and motivation. If such 
patterns exist, it could suggest that merit pay and 
25 
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motivation are systematically associated, though not 
necessarily causally related. Determinations of 
causality might represent an area of future 
psychological research. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This study addressed the following questions: 
1) Is there an association between motivation levels 
among faculty subject to merit pay plans and the 
presence or absence of the four conditions required to 
motivate as stated in Lawler's theory? 
2) If an institution's merit pay practices fit Lawler's 
theory, yet the faculty do not exhibit the expected 
motivation relative to other faculty groups examined, 
are certain factors evident that might thwart the 
incentive plan? Likewise, if institutions in the study 
have motivated faculty despite minimal conformance to, 
or even the absence of, any of the conditions in 
Lawler's theory, are there other forces that appear to 
motivate? 
THE ROLE OF THEORY 
Motivation-Reward Theory 
Several psychological theories have been developed 
to explain motivation behavior as related to pay and 
other external rewards. While this study relied on 
expectancy theory, research in motivation has produced 
several other theories and approaches to explain human 
motivational behavior. These alternative theories are 
briefly described. 
26 
Drive theory was one of the earliest explanations 
posited by psychologists. Drive theory rests on the 
basic assumption that people will always select from 
alternative courses of action the one alternative which 
they think will maximize their pleasure and minimize 
their pain . This theory relies on past events as a key 
influence on current behavior. It is an explanation of 
why people behaved in a particular way that cannot, 
however, predict future behavior (Lawler 1971) Later 
research in drive theory introduced the concepts of 
learning and stimulus-response as explanations of 
behavior directed toward satisfying events. Along with 
the strength of individual drive, Hull (1943) expanded 
the theory to include habit strength which is 
determined from one's previous experiences, or how 
often a particular behavior has been associated with 
rewards. Later refinements to drive theory accounted 
for changes in predicted behavior as a result of 
changes in incentives, whereas previously the theory's 
orientation had been only to the past (Lawler 1971). 
One group of motivational theories has been 
classified as content theories, focusing on what 
motivates people. Another set of theories, termed 
process theories, focusing on how people are motivated 
(Henderson 1979) Among the content theories, 
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MacGregor's (1960) Theory X and Theory Y originated in 
studies that examined the reasons that certain people 
achieve success. Based on Maslow' s hierarchy of needs, 
MacGregor's research identified the need for power, 
achievement and affiliation as forces that drive people 
to achieve (Atkinson 1957). Theory X and Theory Y 
distinguish between the different levels of human 
needs, with the former recognizing only basic 
biological needs and the latter assuming that higher 
level needs such as mental challenge, self-control, and 
opportunities to exercise initiative are equally 
important means to affect behavior. 
Herzberg' s theory of motivation identified one set 
of factors that provide high levels of job satisfaction 
and another set that prevent dissatisfaction. The 
"satisfiers," such as achievement, recognition and 
responsibility can motivate improved performance. The 
"hygiene" factors, primarily extrinsic rewards, such as 
pay, can prevent dissatisfaction if provided in 
sufficient amounts. The satisfiers, or motivators, are 
primarily intrinsic rewards which Herzberg regarded as 
the key factors that lead to effective performance. 
According to Herzberg's theory, motivators, which are 
internally generated, must be in the work environment 
in order to have an effect on long-run behavior. By 
28 
contrast, extrinsic rewards such as pay have only a 
short-term impact (Herzberg 1959). Herzberg's theory 








theories of motivation, 
on human reaction to 
inequities, a theory later applied to work behavior by 
Adams ( 1963) . This theory reflects the important 
effects of human values and attitudes on behavior. The 
theory suggests that an individual's motivation is a 
reaction to perceived inequities. That is, individuals 
will be motivated to act in order to eliminate 
inequities in such factors as pay and hours worked. In 
a work situation, employees generally accomplish this 
equilibrium by requesting greater rewards or by 
reducing work and making fewer contributions (Henderson 
1979). 
Luthans and Kreitner (1975) took an approach to 
motivational theory that differs from the content and 
process approaches. They focused on operant behavior, 
which see drives as a reaction to a need--a stimulus-
response approach--where consequences are the important 
factor for the individual. The controls, 
reinforcements, and environmental limits that signal 
29 
indivi' duals that certa'n i consequences will occur, 
therefore become the catalysts in affecting behavior. 
Expectancy Theory 
Expectancy theory, the basis of this study, was 
introduced into motivation-reward research by Vroom 
(1964). It is a widely accepted and utilized proc~ss 
theory of motivation which states that individuals 
believe (or expect) that if they behave in a certain 
way, they will get certain things. The model of 
expectancy theory evolved from earlier theories of 
expectations and the valence, or attractiveness, of 
outcomes. These theories converged, with the 
expectancy measures weighted by the valence of rewards 
to determine behavior. Theorists maintained that an 
individual's behavior is influenced by the strength of 
the person's belief (expectancy) that the performance 
of a specific behavior will be followed by a given 
reward (outcome) and by the value of .that outcome for 
the particular individual (Lawler 1973). 
The expectancy model consists 
of three 
interrelated elements that induce a level of effort 
that in turn achieves a particular outcome. First, the 
performance-outcome expectancy is an individual's 
belief that by behaving in a particular way certain 
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things will occur. Namely, that outcomes or rewards 
will result. For faculty, these expectancies come 
from their perception of the institution's policies, 
their own past experiences, and indications from deans 
or department chairs. A second element of the model, 
which moderates the performance-outcome expectancy, is 
the "valence" of rewards, or the attractiveness an 
individual places on particular outcomes. For example, 
the value attached to compensation, praise, or 
courseload reductions. Third, the effort-performance 
expectancy is the individual's perception of how 
difficult and how probable it will be to achieve the 
level of behavior that will generate the outcome. As 
with performance-outcome expectancies, one's perception 
of the effort required to achieve a given level of 
performance is influenced by past experiences, 
communications from others, as well as one's self-
esteem. 
Expectancy theory maintains that in order for a 
person to be motivated to behave in a particular way, 
an individual must hold all three of these conditions 
in the expectancy model positively: first, a belief 
that good performance is achievable through effort, 
that is, that the individual can control the quality of 
his or her performance; second, a belief that good 
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performance results in a positive outcome; and third, 
that the particular outcome is valued highly by the 
individual (Lawler 1971). Lawler prefers expectancy 
theory because it considers a multiplicity of attitudes 
that affect motivation to perform. The assumption 
about the model as it relates to motivational forces is 
that the higher the effort-performance expectancy and 
the more closely performance is seen to be related to 
valued outcomes, the greater the motivation will be. 
Theoretical Approach of this Study 
This study focused on the portion of the 
expectancy model that involves motivation to perform 
and the attitudes and beliefs that produce the level of 
motivation, rather than on the outcomes or performance 
aspect of the model. Specifically, effort was the key 
variable in assessing faculty motivation under 
different merit pay plans. There are important 
differences between effort and performance (or quality 
of performance) that make effort the more appropriate 
variable to study. For this study, the level of 
motivation (as measured by effort) that leads to a 
particular performance, rather than the performance per 
se was crucial because financial incentives are meant 
to act directly on motivation to behave; a particular 
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performance or outcome may or may not occur as a result 
of effort. Conceptually, how hard a person works 
(effort) is different from how well one works 
(proficiency) . Merit pay works to affect effort, and 
not ability, which would be measured by performance 
results. Campbell et al. (1970) identified four 
dependent motivational variables: effort, choice of 
behavior, performance, and sat is faction. Of these 
four, effort and choice of behavior were cited as the 
variables for which motivational theories have the most 
direct implications. In the case of faculty, potential 
reaction to financial incentives are likely to be 
increased overall effort, and the choice of activities 
to which time and effort are allocated. 
Effort can be measured more straightforwardly than 
performance because it is difficult to separate the 
part of performance output due to organizational 
climate variables and the part due to individual 
variables (Schneider and Olson 1970) 









indices of motivation. The primary problem is that the 
complexity of the performance variable can easily make 
it an incomplete measure because the relationships 
between many behavioral variables and the influence of 
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additional factors, such as ability and opportunity, on 
performance make an accurate measure of performance 
nearly impossible. For faculty, this dilemma is 
illustrated by differences among the disciplines in the 
uneven availability of grants and other funded support 
for research. 
Because organizations are ultimately interested in 
outcomes, however, it is important that measures of 
effort and motivation have some relevance to an 
individual's performance. Effort and motivation as 
measured by expectancy type perceptions have 
consistently been found to be significantly related to 
performance (Lawler and Suttle 1973). Numerous studies 
have found measures of motivation, as related to 
performance, to be highly predictive (Katerberg and 
Blau 1983, Porter and Lawler 1968, Mitchell and 
Albright 1972, Terborg and Miller 1978, Wofford 1982). 
Predicting actual performance on the job, however, 
becomes highly complex, and motivation is only one of 
many factors that must be considered. 
Thus, effort was the most appropriate measure for 
gauging motivation in this study. Besides being 
measurable, effort is considered a reliable indicator 
of motivation, and has frequently directly related to 
actual performance. 
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Study's use of Lawler's Four Theory Conditions 
Before making the assessments about the motivation 
of the faculty in this study, the merit pay plans at 
each institution were characterized in terms of 
c onformity to Lawler' s theory. It is important, 
therefore, to discuss each of the conditions in the 
theory. 
1. Pay-Performance Relationship. When an 
individual believes he or she receives a financial 
reward for performing well, it strengthens his or her 
belief in the connection between pay and performance 
and reinforces the motivational power of pay. When 
workers do not receive financial rewards that they 
believe are due them for effective performance, then 
these beliefs are weakened and the employee will be 
less motivated (Lawler 1971). Often administrators 
implement reward systems under the assumption that the 
system inherently motivates employee performance, 
without considering whether employees perceive that the 
rewards are actually determined by performance. Lawler 
theorized that in order for pay to motivate 
performance, employees must believe that good 
performance leads to high pay. This is the foundation 
of the expectancy theory: that individuals believe or 
expect that certain behaviors will lead to c ertain 
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rewards (or sanctions). The greater an individual's 
expectancy about the positive consequences of a 
particular action, the greater the motivation will be. 
Other studies have reached similar conclusions 
about the importance of the employees' perception of a 
pay-performance link. McGeoch and Irion (1952) 
provided evidence that rewards are maximally effective 
when employees perceive a direct connection between the 
behavior and the reward. They concluded that the key 
to the success of an incentive pay plan is the 
employees' perception of how their pay is determined. 
The pay-for-performance link is more easily 
established in jobs where objective measures are used 
to evaluate employees because the measures are clear to 
the public, and to the workers the relationship between 
pay and performance is plainly visible (Lawler 1971). 
The actual number of products made by factory workers 
or the number and dollar value of sales can be readily 
quantified as the objective basis for performance 
rewards. By contrast, evaluations of faculty 
activities are largely subjective, which makes the 
reward-performance link more difficult to demonstrate . 
An environment of trust must exist between 
employees and employers in order for incentive pay to 
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motivate successfully. Employees must believe that the 
reward system, however well-designed, functions 
properly in practice. The dissatisfaction associated 
with many merit pay plans results from flawed 
implementation of the plans which lead employees to 
doubt that rewards are related to performance, despite 
the administration's claims to the contrary. Most 
studies have shown that people prefer to be paid for 
performance, but a large gap often exists between the 
perception of supervisors and subordinates about the 
extent to which merit pay plans actually are 
performance based (Hackman 1970). Employee bel iefs in 
the connection between good performance and rewards is 
closely linked to the other conditions of the theory. 
2. Value of Pay. If an individual believes that 
superior performance will be rewarded with additional 
pay, the reward will make a difference in behavior only 
if the employee places significant value on monetary 
compensation. This is the second condition that Lawler 
contends must prevail in 
performance. Research 
order for pay to motivate 
has shown that the more 
importance employees attach to pay , the more motivated 
they will be to perform in a way that will enable them 
to earn more money (Lawler 1971). The value of pay is 
not just limited to the pay itself , but inc ludes the 
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benefits that the money leads to, such as acquisitions, 
happiness, and security. Pay also symbolizes status, 
recognition, and a reflection upon the quality of one's 
work. Lawler refers to the "instrumentality" of need, 
which implies that pay can be used to satisfy a wide 
variety of needs, including esteem, physiological 
needs, autonomy, security, social needs, and self-
actualization (Lawler 1973). 
How important pay is, why it is important, and the 
ways in which people respond to it, however, differ 
from person to person. These values are not fixed or 
constant, and they can be expected to change over time 
in response to both individual and organizational 
developments. Some faculty members may view the 
primary value of teaching and research activities as 
the intrinsic rewards associated with conveying and 
expanding the knowledge of their discipline, while 
others place greater value on the monetary rewards 
associated with good teaching and research performance. 
In a study of university incentive s t ructures (Fenker 
1977) faculty ranked a variety of incentives, both 
monetary and nonmonetary . While the study revealed 
that faculty generally valued monetary rewards highly, 
the degree to which these rewards were valued varied 
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among disciplines and according to the faculty members, 
academic rank. 
An organization cannot control most of the 
elements that affect the value individuals assign to 
pay because that factor is influenced in large part by 
personal background and experience. The organization 
can influence the importance employees place on pay to 
the extent that it portrays monetary rewards as symbols 
of recognition and success (Beer et al. 1984). The 
more public and the more trumpeted the merit pay 
awards, the more the symbolic value of pay becomes 
added to the value individuals attach to monetary 
rewards. 
Increment. Even where 
individuals place a high value on money, that does not 
3. Size of Merit 
necessarily mean that modest monetary rewards will 
motivate employees. To be effective as rewards, merit 
pay increases should be large enough to be meaningful, 
but how large is 1arge enough? Merit pay increases in 
industry during relatively healthy economic periods 
have averaged s-15% of salary. This may not be a large 
enough increment to have a motivational impact (Beer et 
al. 1984). current economic conditions generate even 
smaller merit salary increases for workers. 
Lawler 










the superior performers if employees are to place a 
high value on performance and the raises to which it 
leads. Lawler suggests that two times the size of the 
average COLA may be the effective minimum for merit to 
motivate (Lawler 1971). 
Many factors contribute to determining the size of 
a meaningful pay increase (Krefting and Mahoney 1977). 
In addition to one's current pay, the size of pay 
increases given to others in the organization and the 
impact of the pay increase on one's standard of living 
are factors that affect the meaningfulness of a merit 
pay increase. Individual or group values would 
determine which factors most affect the meaning of a 
pay increase, whether it is the recognition or the 
money itself that is valued about the pay. 
The relative size of the increment is also 
important. The impact of a merit award is diluted if 
there is not a large enough differential in pay 
increases to reflect large differences in performance 
(Lawler 1990). The organization must be willing to 
grant very large and very small increases when 
performance so warrants. The number of faculty members 
awarded merit pay and the range of those awards c an 
affect the motivational effectiveness of the pay 
system. A broader range of awards strongly emphasizes 
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the linkage between performance levels and pay raises. 
A narrow range does not provide employees with the 
perception that significant differences in performance 
result in significantly different rewards. 
The size of the merit increase is related to other 
conditions of the reward environment described by 
Lawler. Augmenting the dollar value of the wage 
increase will strengthen a person's motivation to 
perform only if the employee perceives that pay is tied 
to performance, the first condition discussed. 
Rewarding nearly everyone with pay increases, even 
sizeable increments, will not have a powerful 
motivating effect since most employees assume that not 
all workers perform equally well. There will not be 
the range of rewards employees would expect given the 
perceived range of performance. In addition to 
affecting the importance employees place on monetary 
rewards, as suggested previously, a high level of 
public recognition associated with receiving merit 
awards constitutes part of the reward. Thus, the 
monetary portion of the reward does not have to be as 
large as if pay were kept secret, wherein much of the 
motivational value of recognition is lost (Lawler 
1971). Under a policy of pay secrecy, the dollar 
amount becomes the full measure of the award. Without 
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public recognition as a means of motivation a larger 
increase may be required to make an impact. 
4. Disclosure of Pay Information. Lawler contends 
that under certain circumstances organizational secrecy 
about pay increases and salaries leads to employee 
dissatisfaction and lower motivation. On the other 
hand, public disclosure may encourage motivation if pay 
is truly tied to good performance (Lawler 1990). These 
c onclusions by Lawler are based on studies conducted in 
corporations and government agencies that do not 
disclose salary data. The usual argument for secrecy 
with respect to salaries holds that without the data, 
peers cannot make the unfavorable comparisons that 
inevitably lead to dissatisfaction. Even where secrecy 
exists, however, people make comparisons based on 
guesses, rumors, fragments of information, and 
perceptions (Lawler 1971). Lawler found that, absent 
disclosure, managers do not have an accurate picture of 
what others in the organization earn; they generally 
believe that those above them make less than they 
really do and that those below them in rank make more 
than they actually do. Dissatisfaction, results from a 
perception of overly narrow pay di f ferences b a s e d on 
what they know they earn and what they think others 
earn. 
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Vroom's (1964) research demonstrated that 
performance improves when employees have feedback on 
how they are doing compared to some standard (one of 
which is pay). By extension, not knowing the salaries 
of other employees can weaken motivation. If, for 
instance, some employees think they have a low salary 
compared to others, this misperception sends a false 
signal that they are not doing well. Likewise, if they 
think that improving their work performance will not be 
as highly rewarded as it really is, they may not have 
as much incentive to improve. 
Lawler links openness of pay information to the 
ability of employees to discern whether pay is actually 
based on performance (Lawler 1971) . Misperceptions 
about others' pay cancel or reduce the motivational 
force of differential reward systems. This is a 
particular problem among top performers. They believe 
they are doing well, yet they do not think they are 
being adequately rewarded, so they do not believe that 
pay is based on merit. If employees cannot actually 
see hard evidence that pay and performance are linked, 
pay will not motivate because merit rewards will not be 
seen as obtainable through good performance. 
Public disclosure of pay information is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition to establish the 
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pay-performance link. As important, the data disclosed 
must confirm the linkage. Among the advantages cited 
by Lawler, publicizing salaries and pay increases: 
- Establishes the credibility of performance-based 
pay by showing that pay varies with performance. 
-Can establish role models to emulate by 
revealing the recipients of the highest 
performance payments (Lawler 1971) . 
Communicating information about who earned how much, 
Lawler contended, can develop the employees' trust that 
the pay-performance link exists. 
These four conditions are, according to Lawler, 
those necessary for pay to motivate employees. The 
power of pay to motivate is related to individuals' 
expectancies about how closely they believe their 
performance is related to monetary rewards and the 
value they assign to money, coupled with the 
organization's implementation of the pay plan in regard 
to the size of awards made and public recognition. The 
existence of this relationship in an academic setting 








to address the research 
institution's degree of 
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conformance to Lawler's theory, and 2) faculty 
motivational behavior (the level and direction of 
effort) . The three merit pay institutions selected for 
this study were first examined in terms of conformance 
to the four elements in Lawler's theory. In making 
determinations about faculty behavior, the collection 
of such data required a survey of attitudes. 
Questionnaires were distributed to the faculty members 
at the four selected study institutions. Appendix II 
reproduces the questionnaire that was distributed to 
faculty and to provosts to determine the degree of 
theory conformance (at the three merit pay 
institutions) and to ascertain faculty effort as a 
means of assessing motivation levels used to answer the 
study' s research questions. The questionnaire was 
designed specifically for this study, pre-tested and 
revised before distribution to the four institutions. 
The development of a single question that 
adequately taps the respondent's degree of effort was 
unlikely. Rather, several questions and hypothetical 
situations were presented, some 
theory, each of which provided 
effort or motivation. The 
based on expectancy 
some indication of 
responses to the 
questionnaires provided the data that constituted the 
motivational behavior characteristics of the faculty 
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and revealed the merit pay plan's degree of conformity 
to Lawler's theory. These data created the variables 
for analysis to test the association between faculty 
motivation and the theory's conditions. 
The following discussion describes how the 
questionnaire was designed to evaluate theory 
conformance and faculty motivation. 
Belief that Reward is Linked to Good Performance 
Fenker (1977) used a matrix to ascertain actual 
and perceived associations between various incentives 
and particular faculty behavior. The matrix concept 
was adapted for this study to determine faculty 
perceptions regarding the basis upon which merit pay is 
awarded. Faculty surveyed in this study expressed, on 
a scale of 1 to 5 in level of importance, what they 
perceived to be the strength of the association between 
receiving certain rewards, including merit pay, and the 
performance of various professional activities. This 
exercise revealed the strength of the faculty belief in 
the pay-performance link (theory condition #1). 
Value of Pay 
Because of the importance Lawler places on 
employees' valuation of pay (theory condition f2), i t 
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was essential to know the relative importance faculty 
assigned to merit pay among other rewards. Therefore, 
faculty were asked to designate reward preferences by 
distributing 100 points among various potential rewards 
according to their value to the individual. The list 
included both extrinsic and intrinsic rewards. 
Respondents were also asked to do a similar exercise 
with a list of job attributes such as workplace freedom 
and collegiality, as well as financial security, which 
is directly connected to pay. 
Size of Merit Increments 
The size, range, and distribution of awards for a 
given year at institutions were revealed in the NCPGF 
survey (see page 1 of Appendix I). For the purposes of 
this study, the goal was to select an institution that 
had a relatively wide range of merit award sizes and 
one with a narrow range, and an institution that fell 
in between that range in terms of award sizes. Thus, 
this theory condition was predetermined in the sample 
selection process from information provided from the 
NCPGF survey. In the analysis of the data, the actual 
size of the range between the smallest and largest 
percentage merit awards granted determined the value 
for this variable . 
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Level of Disclosure 
Conformity with theory condition #4, disclosure, 
was determined from the questionnaire given to the 
provosts of the three merit pay institutions used in 
this study. For purposes of analysis, rankings were 
assigned according to the extent to which the 
institution publicized merit pay information: 1 point 
= no disclosure; 2 points= disclosure of award size 
only or the names of recipients only; and 3 points= 
disclosure of both the size of the rewards and the 
recipients. 
Determining Motivation Levels 
Effort as a Measure of Motivation. As explained 
in the previous discussion of expectancy theory, effort 
is an important indicator of level of motivation. 
Vroom defined motivation for effective performance in 
terms of the forces on an individual to exert different 
levels of effort (Vroom 1964). Expectancy theory 
suggests that the strength of a person's efforts 
directly 
perform. 
reflect that indi victual' s motivation to 
Numerous studies have relied on individual 
effort to measure motivation because effort has been 
viewed as the variable that most directly reflects 
motivation (Lawler 1970) 
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Terborg and Miller ( 197 8) claimed that, while 
motivation cannot be measured directly, it is "inferred 
from the arousal, amplitude, persistence, and direction 
of behavior." In their experimental study, they 
emphasized the need to operationalize and measure 
motivation. To demonstrate that performance could be 
predicted through manipulation of motivation the 
authors used measures of effort, which was used to 
gauge motivation. 
Mitchell and Albright (1972) equated effort with 
motivation in a model that examined the ability of 
expectancy theory to predict satisfaction, performance, 
retention, and effort of naval officers. Effort was 
determined by the expectancies regarding effort, 
performance, and rewards, and by the value of rewards 
suggested by expectancy theory. Hackman and Porter 
(1968) also relied on expectancy theory to predict how 
hard people work or their level of effort. Their 
study, using expectancy theory, implied that by 
identifying those perceptions that cause employees to 
work harder, appropriate changes could be made to 
improve motivation. 
Measures of Effort. While effort has been used 
commonly as an indicator of motivation, the methods of 
determining a measure of effort have varied among 
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studies. These approaches represent both direct 
computations of effort as well as measures of 
indicators of effort, using expectancy theory concepts 
of individual perceptions of effort-performance and 
performance-outcome probabilities. 3 These perceptions 
have generally been ascertained through questions that 
ask individuals to rate the strength of the link 
between effort, performance, and outcomes (Porter and 
Lawler 1968, Pearce and Perry 1983, Mitchell and 
Albright 1972, Lawler and Suttle 1973, Hackman and 
Porter 1968, Avery and Neel 1974). These are the 
linkages that Lawler cited as a necessary condition for 
merit pay plans to motivate employee behavior. 
Supervisory evaluations and self-ratings of an 
individual's level of work effort have been a common 
approach to determine effort levels as measures of 
motivation (Schneider and Olson 1970, Schuster et al. 
1971, Mitchell and Albright 1972. Hackman and Porter 
1968, Porter and Lawler 1968). Hackman and Porter 
(1968) used various attitudinal measurement techniques 
3Effort-performance probabilities are the 
individual's perception of how difficult and how 
probable it will be to achieve the level of behavior 
that will generate a particular outcome (reward). 
Performance-outcome probabilities are the individual's 
belief that by behaving in a particular way certain 
things will occur, namely, that outcomes or rewards 
wi ll result . 
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to predict effort and performance. Specifically, they 
developed an instrument for supervisors to measure the 
effort of subordinates and then analyzed the responses 
to test the 
predictions. 
accuracy of the expectancy theory 
The supervisors were asked to rate each 
employee in terms of how much of one's self each person 
put into their work, rather thc1.n on how well they 
performed their jobs. Schneider and Olson (1970) used 
this same instrument to study two groups of nurses, one 
with a pay-for-performance plan, to assess the 
relationship between effort level, value of rewards, 
and pay satisfaction. 
Self-rating questionnaires ask individuals to 
evaluate themselves on a numerical scale, relative to 
others in similar positions or ranks, on the basis of 
how much effort they expend on their jobs. Terborg and 
Miller (1988) used self-ratings and supervisor ratings 
to assess worker effort to support their conclusion 
that motivation and performance were affected by the 
method of payment as well as by the form and extent of 
goal-setting. 
Self-ratings may also include perceptions of work 
quality and productivity. Mitchell and Albright (1972) 
used a self-rating instrument to develop a measure of 
effort, and to obtain a self-evaluation of quality of 
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performance, productivity and job effort. Job effort 
level could range from the minimum required to maintain 
the work role to working "extremely hard." Similarly, 
tests by Schuster et al. (1971) of the hypotheses 
derived from the expectancy model utilized self-ratings 
of perceived work quality, productivity and effort, and 
supervisor ratings of employee effort. These measures 
were examined, along with the importance of pay to 
individuals, to determine whether relationships exist 
among expectancy perceptions and measures of effort and 
performance. 
In a study of the relationship between effort and 
performance of a group of engineers, Williams and 
Seiler (1973) viewed effort, or how hard one works, as 
a measure of work motivation. They relied on both 
supervisory and self-assessment of effort. Among the 
measures of job behavior obtained by Porter and Lawler 
(1968), were two self-rated criteria, one of which was 
the manager's rating of himself as to the amount of 
effort put forth on the job in relation to others with 
similar duties. Self-assessments of performance often 
have been found to be somewhat inaccurate due to 
individuals' need to protect egos and self-esteem, and 
to the ambiguous performance feedback from the work 
environment, which forces individuals to rely more on 
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their own judgements (Ashford 1989). Yet self-ratings 
are directly related to an individual's commitment to 
work, to feelings about the adequacy of pay, and to how 
hard people work. Supervisors are the only other 
source of reporting worker effort, but they are unable 
to gauge as well individual perceptions of effort. 
Despite some self-rater bias that results due to a 
"halo effect" of viewing one's self in higher regard 
than others might, individuals should provide the best 
indication of their effort (Mitchell 1974) 
Other Factors Influencing Motivation. In addition 
to effort, other factors influence individual 
motivation to perform. While numerous motivation 
studies have focused on effort level, the directional 
component of effort also has been found to be a factor 
influenced by work incentives (Katerburg and Blau 
1983) . In contrast to the intensity or amplitude 
measure of effort, the directional component further 
assesses how efforts are allocated among the many 
possible activities individuals might pursue at work. 
In jobs with a relatively high level of latitude 
in behavior, the choices individuals make about 
allocating time to specific activities assumes 
increased importance. Irrespective of the incentive 
system, faculty, as a rule, have significantly more 
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latitude to determine the direction of effort, whether 
to teaching, service, or research. A faculty member 
who invests a high level of effort in teaching, when 
the reward system is based largely on research success, 
will probably not receive the expected rewards, despite 
the intense effort. 
Demographic characteristics of faculty, such as 
tenure, years in a faculty position, age, salary 
history, discipline, and rank may also be important 
considerations in evaluating faculty behavior. These 
factors may influence the level of effort an individual 
puts into his or her job (Fenker 1977). 
Though not included in the actual determination of 
motivation, environmental factors often explain some of 
the phenomena observed (Pearce and Perry 1983). 
Factors such as level of funds budgeted for merit pay, 
design or modifications made in the appraisal ratings, 
and administrative or legislative influences may affect 
implementation, and, therefore, affect employee 
perceptions of merit pay plans and their desire to 
exert effort. 
Motivation Measurement Used in this Study. 
Faculty members were asked on a questionnaire (Appendix 
II) to indicate their performance-reward expectancies, 
the value they placed on pay, and their assumptions 
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about their effort and work habits under various 
proposed incentive schemes. The measure of current 
faculty effort level (Question #3) was the number of 
hours per week the respondent spent "fully engaged" in 
his or her work. That is, the time one spent on all 
professional work, including teaching and research 
activities, campus and professional service, and grant 
applications. The directional aspect of effort was 
determined by the allocation of time among teaching, 
research, and service activities (Question #5). 
The influence of financial rewards on the level 
and direction of effort was determined by whether the 
respondent would change the amount of time devoted to 
work and/or the allocation of that time among certain 
activities if, as a result, there would be a merit pay 
increment. The faculty in this study were presented 
with hypothetical situations where specified amounts of 
merit pay would be awarded for specified activities. 
For both effort level and direction, faculty were 
asked, "Given the prospect of the monetary award, would 
you change your behavior?" (Questions #4 and #6.) 
The faculty members' responses to these questions, 
indicated the potential impact of financial rewards on 
activity choices and a sense of the power of extrinsic 
rewards to influence the level of faculty effort. For 
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some faculty the intrinsic rewards gained from their 
current activities may be more valued than extrinsic 
rewards and thus their behavior would not change, 
despite the prospect of greater financial remuneration. 
While the responses to the questions constitute 
intentions on the part of faculty, Lawler (1970) 
reported that intentions are often good predictors of 
actual performance. 
METHODS FOR ANALYZING DATA 
The data collected to answer research question fl 
of this study can be grouped into two categories: 1) 
Data that characterized the merit pay plan in terms of 
Lawler's theory (independent variables), and; 2) 
measures of faculty effort and motivation (dependent 
variables). Since the objective of the study was to 
relate Lawler's theory to faculty motivation, the 
analytical tool used 
statistical association. 
to analyze the data was 
Such an approach determines 
whether a systematic relationship exists between the 
two variables and, if so, the strength of the 
relationship. The main goal of this analysis was to 
establish whether or not the variables were related, 
not to make estimates or predictions about the effects 
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of one on the other. Any associations that result do 
not reveal causality. 
The hypothesis, or expected outcome of the 
relationship test between level of conformity to theory 
and faculty motivation, was that the more closely the 
institution's merit pay plan conformed to the 
conditions of Lawler's theory, the greater the degree 
of motivation or effort that would be displayed by the 
faculty. Variables created from the elements of 
Lawler's theory were tested against the faculty 
motivation indicators gleaned from the questionnaire 
responses. 
To create the independent variables, the 
institutions were characterized and scored as described 
in Table 1 below, in accordance with their degree of 
conformity to Lawler's theory. Two independent 
variables were created comprising the theory's four 
conditions. One independent variable summed the 
individual's pay-performance relationship ratings with 
the value assigned to money (the points assigned to 
merit pay and financial security). The second 
independent variable summed the size of the merit pay 
award range at the institution and the points 
associated with the institution's level of disclosure 
of merit pay information. 
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TABLE 1 . CREATION OF TWO INDEPENDENT (THEORY) VARIABLES 
USING THEORY CONDITIONS 
Independent Variable #1: 
a. Strength of pay-
performance relationship 
b. Value of pay 
Measure 
Sum of scores (Q. la) 
indicating importance of 
work activities to 
receiving merit award 
Points assigned by 
faculty to merit pay 
and financial security 
(Q. 2) indicating 
importance to job 
THEORY VARIABLE #1 = SUM OF a AND b (Individual 
Expectancy) 
Independent Variable #2 
c. Size of awards 
d. Disclosure policy 
Percentage point spread 
between lowest and 
highest merit awards 
granted 
1 point= no disclosure 
2 points = size of awards 
or recipient names 
3 points= both reward 
size and recipient names 
THEORY VARIABLE #2 = SUM OF c AND d (Pay plan factors) 
increments are associated with greater expenditure of 
effort and greater redirection of effort toward 
rewarded activities. 
Because of the potential influence of individual 
faculty characteristics on their reaction to 
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incentives, subgroup comparisons were constructed using 
the demographic data and tested for associations with 
faculty motivation. This indicated whether there were 
certain faculty characteristics that had a particularly 
strong relationship to motivation, and therefore may 
partially explain reported motivation levels. 
The non-merit pay institution served as a control 
of sorts to determine whether the faculty responses to 
incentives differed despite the absence of an existing 
merit pay plan. Since the non-merit pay institution 
had no comparable conditions with which to create 
independent variables to correlate with behavior, the 
analysis of its faculty's responses were restricted to 
descriptive. 
LIMITS IMPOSED BY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
The limited number of subjects examined, the use 
of questionnaires to assess behavior, and various 
statistical techniques inherently place some 
limitations on the use of the data for drawing broad 
conclusions. This study focused on only one type of 
institution, the four-year liberal arts college. The 
variety of missions, sizes, and administrative 
practices among other classifications of institutions 
undoubtedly influence the pay environment and faculty 
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reactions. This makes generalizations from one type of 
institution to another unreliable. However, for the 
purposes and scope of this study, as a preliminary test 
of one theory of pay and motivation, the selection of 
four similar four-year institutions was most 
appropriate. 
The faculty sample responding to the study 
represented about 25 percent of the total faculty at 
each institution. While this exhibits strong 
representation of the population, the stability of the 
sample is weaker. The absolute size of the faculty was 
relatively small in comparison to the number of 
associations tested in this study. Thus, some 
statistically significant associations can be expected 
to result just by chance. By looking at the trends in 
the significant associations resulting from this data, 
however, one could reasonably speculate which occurred 
by chance. 
The use of survey questionnaires required a 
modified test of the theory, which analyzed behavior 
trends across a group rather than probing each 
indi victual' s reaction to performing various tasks under 
specified incentives, thereby creating a within-person 
estimation of motivation. This depth of analysis to 
achieve within-rater conclusions could not be 
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practically accomplished given the sample size and 
scope of this study. While the approach used in this 
study is not a true application of within subject 
testing, and therefore not completely consistent with 
expectancy theory, it has been an acceptable research 
method in assessing motivation and rewards (Arvey and 
Neel 1974, Mitchell and Albright 1972, Pearce and Perry 
1983, Schneider and Olson 1970). 
Additionally, the use of surveys or questionnaires 
that attempt to cover complex topics, can most often 
only do so in a relatively limited manner. A 
standardized questionnaire typically represents "the 
least common denominator in assessing peoples' 
attitudes, orientations, circumstances and experiences" 
(Babbie 1983). A degree of artificiality results from 
individual responses since they are self-reported 
responses to past or hypothetical actions. In 
addition, perceptions are limited to cognitive factors, 
such as the hours one is willing to work or the amount 
of output desired. There are likely other intervening 
factors that individuals do not consider, such as the 
effects of the workplace environment or atmosphere, and 
the inner need for achievement, power, and recognition. 
Nevertheless, given the difficulties of penetrating 
beyond cognitive perceptions and the inability of the 
62 
researcher to conduct direct observations, the 
questionnaire, based on similar usage by researchers in 
the past, appeared to be the most appropriate and most 
feasible approach. The success of the questionnaire 
rested in large part on the willingness of institutions 
and faculty to respond honestly and fully . 
The influence of intervening variables, other than 
those examined in this study, may also affect the 
relationship between merit pay and motivation. 
Therefore, the evidence from this study does not 
necessarily establish that the behaviors and reaction 
reported result from merit pay plans. This was not the 
intent of the study. However, recognizing the 
parameters of the study as a test of the presence of 
particular behavior characteristics, given the 
existence of a set of theoretical conditions, the study 
can contribute to a test of the theory and can 
delineate 
research. 




The data analyses were conducted using the 
statistical package SPSS-X. 
involved: 
The major calculations 
• Measures of association between elements of 
Lawler's theory and the responses to the 
behavioral questions in order to test the study's 
central thesis. 
• Measures of association between the 
demographic characteristics of the faculty and 
responses to the behavioral questions in order to 
determine any secondary associations that answer 
the ancillary question of the study. 
• Descriptive analysis of the responses to the 
questions that led to determining the extent of 
the theory conditions. 
• Descriptive analysis of the responses to the 
behavioral questions regarding levels and 
direction of effort under various incentives. 
For purposes of the analysis of data, the four 
institutions involved in the study will be referred to 
as 'MP l', 'MP 2', 'MP3', and 'No MP' (MP=merit pay). 
A total of 70 responses from the faculty at all the 
merit pay institutions were used in the analysis, 21 
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from 'MP 1', 29 from 'MP 2', and 21 from 'MP 3'. 
Nineteen responses were used from 'No MP'. In all 
cases, the responses represented approximately 25 
percent of the institution's faculty. This was an 83 
percent return rate of questionnaires sent to 
approximately 30 percent of faculty at each institution 
(to targeted departments). 
INSTITUTIONAL AND INCENTIVE PLAN CHARACTERISTICS 
Table 2 describes the attributes of the pay plans 
at the three institutions with merit pay plans. 
The merit pay plans of all three institutions are 
well-established. All of the institutions with merit 
pay plans provided cost of living (COLA) increases too, 
ranging from 3 to 5.5 percent for 1990-91. 
Only the plan at 'MP 2' uses formally defined 
achievement levels to evaluate faculty for merit pay. 
At 'MP 1' and 'MP 3' the Provost and/or President 
determine the criteria for rewarding merit pay as well 
as the individuals receiving it. At 'MP 2' , the 
faculty determine the criteria, while the Department 
Chairs and the Provost determine the recipients. None 
of the institutions place a limit on the number of 
faculty who may receive merit pay. 
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TABLE 2. MERIT PAY PLAN CHARACTERISTICS, 
BY INSTITUTION 
COLA granted 
Amount of COLA 
% faculty receiving 
merit pay 
Avg. merit award 
Highest award 
Lowest award 
























































NR=not reported; the analysis relied primarily on the 
size of the range of awards rather than absolute size. 
TESTS OF ASSOCIATION 
Selection of Measures of Association 
The selection of appropriate measures to test for 
association between variables depends on the nature of 
the particular variables, whether nominal, ordinal, 
integer, or ratio (Buchanan 1988). 
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Most of the variables in the study were ordinal 
variables, including all the responses to the questions 
regarding the direction of additional effort under 
varying incentive levels, and three of the four theory 
elements--public disclosure, 
relationship, and value of money. 
·pay-performance 
For associations 
involving ordinal variables the Somers' d statistic was 
selected because it assumes an independent and 
dependent variable (Norusis 1987) The significance 
test used for ordinal variables was that which was 
calculated for the tau statistic, another ordinal 
measure of association, which is valid since the 
denominator for all ordinal variables is the same and 
would produce the same significance outcome (Norusis 
1987). 
Interval variables in the study included the 
current effort level and additional effort level under 
varying sizes of in'centives (both measured in hours) . 
Of the demographic variables, while tenure does not 
have an obviously ordinal orientation, it is considered 
a dichotomy nominal variable (only two possible 
answers), which can be treated as a two-level interval 
(Buchanan 1988). The variables for faculty receiving 
merit pay (%) and the average merit pay awarded (%) 
were also treated as interval variables. For interval 
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variables the selected association measurement was the 
correlation coefficient (r) and the significance 
calculated in conjunction. All tests of significance 
were based on a standard of .05 confidence level. 
The nominal variables in this study included 
faculty member's rank and discipline. In tests of 
association involving these variables, the lambda 
statistic was used along with the Chi-square test for 
significance. 
Test of Research Question #1: 
Theory Conditions and Faculty Effort 
Tests of association for the two independent 
variables created to represent level of conformity to 
theory (1. the individual's expectancy, consisting of 
the pay-performance relationship and the value assigned 
to money, and 2. the institutional variable comprised 
of the size of the range of awards and the level of 
public disclosure) were each run against each of the 
behavior (effort) variables. These tests addressed the 
central question of the study: Is there an association 
between motivation levels among faculty subject to 
merit pay plans and the existence of the conditions 
required to motivate as stated in Lawler's theory? 







expectancies about merit pay and effort levels. There 
were some significant relationships between the way the 
institution implements the plan (award size and 
disclosure) and effort in two of the faculty 
activities. As the size of the range of merit awards 
and level of disclosure increased the faculty reported 
a willingness to put more effort into teaching and 
professional service for all the hypothetical reward 
levels presented. 
Table 3 summarizes the results of the crosstabs 
and calculated association measures and their 
significance for those associations that resulted in 
significant relationships. 
Tests of association to address research question 
:/f:l were conducted using a second approach. Rather than 
using two independent variables for the theory 
conditions, the four conditions were tested separately 
against reported faculty effort to examine whether any 
one condition corresponded to motivational patterns. 
Significant relationships that resulted are presented 
in Table 3. 
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TABLE 3. IUCSULTS OF TESTS OF ASSOCIATION 
BETWEEN THEORY CONDITIONS AND 




heory Variable #2 




Teaching for 5% merit 
Teaching for 10% merit 
Teaching for 15% merit 
Teaching for bonus 
Service to prof. 5% merit 
Service to prof. 10% merit 
Service to prof. 15% merit 
Service to prof. for bonus 
l_ndependent variable: 





Teaching for 5% merit 
Teaching for 10% merit 
Teaching for 15% merit 
Teaching for bonus 
Research for 5% merit 
Research for 10% merit 
Research for 15% merit 
Research for bonus 
Community serv. 10% merit 't 
Community serv. 15% mer~ 
Service to prof. 5% mer
1
~t 
Service to prof. 10% mer~t 
Service to prof. 15% mer
1 
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TABLE 3. cont'd RESULTS OF TESTS OF ASSOCIATION 
BETWEEN THEORY CONDITIONS AND 
REPORTED FACULTY EFFORT 
Independent variable 




Additional effort for: 
Teaching for bonus 
Service to prof. for 5% merit 
Service to prof. for 10% merit 
Service to prof. for 15% merit 
Independent variable 















Pay-Performance Relationship. The results of the 
calculated measures of association between the pay-
performance variable and the behavior response 
variables resulted in negative relationships between 
the faculty's perceived strength of the pay-performance 
relationship and virtually all of the expressed 
intentions for increased effort under the various 
incentives for all work activities. As the score for 
the pay-performance variable increased (i.e., the 
strength of the perceived relationship got stronger), 
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the faculty showed less willingness to devote more 
effort to: 
( 1) teaching for all three merit award levels 
(5 %, 10%, 15%) 
(2) research for all three merit award levels 
and the bonus 
(3) campus and community service for the two 
largest merit awards 
( 4) service to profession for all merit award 
levels and the bonus. 
Value of Money. Calculations for associations 
between the degree of importance one places on money 
and the behavioral variables resulted in no significant 
relationships. That is, evidence of Lawler's theory 
that a higher value an individual places on money 
creates more motivation to behave in a way to receive 
a pay award, was not exhibited here. 
Range. The test of association revealed that the 
greater the range between high and low merit awards, 
the greater the overall effort level of the faculty 
respondents. Additionally, they expressed willingness 
to increase their effort in service to one's profession 
for merit awards and in teaching for a bonus. 
Disclosure Policy. The results of the association 
measures on the disclosure policy showed a significant 
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relationship only with the behavior variable 
corresponding to current effort levels. The more open 
the disclosure policy, the higher the effort level. 
Test of Research Question #2: 
Demographic Data and Behavior 
To address the question of whether other factors 
appear to relate to motivation levels among faculty 
under various pay plan conditions, several of the 
demographic variables about the faculty members and 
about the institution were selected to test for 
association with the responses regarding effort. 
A brief overview of the characteristics of the 
faculty reveals that in terms of rank, tenure, and age, 
the faculty respondents from the four institutions were 
relatively similar, as shown in Table 4. Overall, 
assistant, associate, and full professors were 
approximately evenly represented, although 'MP3' had 
a much greater proportion of full professors. 
Approximately two-thirds of the faculty held tenure, 
more than three-fourths at 'MP 2'. Most of the faculty 
respondents were between 30 and 49, with only 3 percent 
under 30 and 4 percent over 60. 
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TABLE 4. FACULTY CHARACTERISTICS, BY INSTITUTION 
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<$30,000 13 40 6 7 7 
$30-49,000 51 53 50 50 60 
$50-69,000 31 0 39 7 33 
$70-100,000 3 0 5 7 0 
-----------------------------------------------------
Years as a faculty 
member (avg) 13.7 12.4 15 20 19 
Years at present 
inat. (avg) 11. 6 9.6 12 17.6 16.5 
The disciplines most represented were History, 
Mathematics, and English as these were the targeted 
departments. As discussed earlier, 'MP 1' included 




departments in order to create a larger sample. 'MP 2' 
included faculty from the Economics department due to 
many of the History faculty's unfamiliarity with the 
merit .pay plan. 
Across all institutions, over half of the faculty 
respondents earned salaries between $30,000 and 
$49,000, and nearly one-third were between $50,000 and 
$69,000. Only three percent earned between $70,000 and 
$100,000. Faculty from 'MP 1' had lower average 
salaries than the other institutions, as 40% of the 
respondents earned less than $30,000. 
The average number of years of faculty service was 
fourteen, 11. 6 years on average at their present 
institution. 'MP 1' had the lowest average 
institutional tenure, 9.6 years, as well as the lowest 
average overall, 12.4 years. 
These demographic statistics were tested first as 
independent variables against the behavior responses to 
the highest merit award (15%) to check for any 
relationship. If a significant relationship was shown 
at the 15 percent award level, the variable was then 
tested for association against the other levels of 
awards. 
Significant relationships were found between the 
following variables and faculty effort: 
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• Salary. A negative association resulted 
between salary and additional effort in teaching 
and service to one's profession for all award 
levels presented. Those faculty with higher 
salaries were less likely to devote additional 
effort toward teaching and service to one's 
profession. 
• Tenure. A significant relationship existed 
between tenure and additional hours of work for 
merit pay and between tenure and additional 
effort for teaching for a merit incentive. 
Faculty members without tenure were more likely 
to devote more hours to their jobs at all award 
levels and more effort to teaching for a 15% 
merit award and bonus. 
• Average Merit Pay. A significant negative 
relationship was found between the size of the 
average merit pay increment and the current level 
of effort and additional effort to service to 
one's profession for all merit pay award levels. 
In other words, the higher the average merit pay 
awarded by the institution, the lower the current 
level of effort and the less likely were faculty 
willing to devote additional effort to service to 
one's profession. 
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Average merit pay also produced a 
significant relationship with the pay-performance 
variable. The higher the average merit pay, the 
stronger was the perceived pay-performance 
relationship score. 
• Percentage of Faculty Receiving Merit Pay. A 
significant negative relationship was found 
between the percentage of the faculty at an 
institution receiving merit pay and the current 
level of effort and service to one's profession 
for all merit pay levels. That is, the higher 
the percentage of faculty receiving merit pay 
awards, the lower was the current level of effort 
for and effort in professional service. 
Percentage of faculty receiving merit pay 
was also tested for association with the pay-
performance variable. A significant relationship 
was established: the higher the percentage of 
faculty receiving merit pay, the stronger the 
perceived pay-performance relationship. 
THE FOUR THEORY CONDITIONS - DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Despite the absence of many relationships between 
the four theory conditions and faculty effort to 
validate Lawler' s theory, responses from the study 
77 
questionnaires proved to be worth a brief discussion to 
reveal overall attitudes about faculty's reaction to 
incentives and their perceived behavior. It also 
permits the inclusion of an examination of the 
respondents at. 'No MP' with respect to the institutions 
with merit pay plans. 
Reward-Performance Relationship 
The study questionnaire asked faculty respondents 
the following question regarding the relationship 
between performing various faculty activities and 
receiving particular rewards: 
In your opinion, at your institution, how direct is the 
relationship between three kinds of rewards (merit pay, 
public recognition, promotion) and specific work 
activities? Circle the number from the scale that 
indicates the importance of these activities to 
receiving the specified reward, not as you think it 
should be, but as you perceive the situation at your 
institution. For example, if you feel there is a very 
strong relationship between effective teaching and 
receiving merit pay (i.e., that effective teaching is 
'very important' to receiving merit pay), you would 
circle 5 for the first response below; if you think it 
has very little or no importance to your receiving the 








Three rewards and six job activities were presented to 
gauge the reward-performance relationship. Thus, there 
were 18 scores from each respondent: 
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Reward 
Merit Pay Increase 
Public Recognition 




Receipt of external 
funds 
Service on campus 
committee 
Service to profession 
Public service 
Table 5 shows the distribution of faculty 
responses to each combination of reward-activity for 
all the institutions (4 & 5=important, 1 & 
2=unimportant) . For the three types of rewards 
presented an overwhelming majority (69-85%) consider 
effective teaching to be important in earning rewards. 
About half of the respondents also cited scholarly 
publications as important. A large proportion of 
faculty (42-54%) felt that service to one's profession 
and public service activities were unimportant in 
receiving any of the designated rewards. Other than 
effective teaching, less than half of the faculty 
believed that performing any of the designated 
activities was important in gaining a reward of public 
recognition. 
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TABLE 5 . FACULTY PERCEPTIONS OF THE REWARD-
PERFORMANCE RELATIONSHIP 
Faculty responding that ALL MP1MP2MP3N:M' 
activity was important/ 
unimportant* to receiving 
MERIT PAY: (percent) 
Effective Teaching 
Important 83 80 89 79 
Unimportant 6 7 0 14 
Publications 
Important 42 13 84 14 
Unimportant 38 53 5 64 
External Funds 
Important 19 0 26 29 
Unimportant 35 67 16 29 
Campus Committee 
Important 60 53 53 79 
Unimportant 19 20 16 21 
Service to Profession 
Important 19 27 11 21 
Unimportant 42 53 37 36 
Public Service 
Important 19 27 5 29 
Unimportant 54 47 74 36 
Faculty responding that 
activity was important/ 
unimportant to receiving 
PUBLIC RECOGNITION: 
Effective Teaching 
Important 69 73 63 71 87 
Unimportant 15 0 21 21 13 
Publications 
Important 48 27 74 36 53 
Unimportant 25 33 10 36 33 
External Funds 
Important 42 20 68 29 40 
Unimportant 31 40 16 43 40 
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* 'Important' to receiving reward=4 or 5 on question 
scale (Very important or important. 
'Unimportant' to receiving reward=! or 2 on question 




Value of Money 
Faculty respondents from the merit pay 
institutions were asked to assign points, according to 
their importance, to various types of possible rewards, 
including merit pay, and various aspects of the job, 
including financial security. Respondents distributed 
100 points among ten rewards in a way that reflected 
the relative importance or value of each reward to that 
individual. (Not every reward had to be assigned 
points) : 
Promotion in rank 
One semester leave of absence with pay 
Tenure 
Ten percent merit salary increase 
Public recognition of outstanding teaching 
One course load reduction for a semester 
Appointment to professional or campus honorary 
position 
$5,000 university research grant 
Two-week paid leave for professional development 
Peer recognition in discipline 
In a similar fashion, faculty were asked to distribute 
100 points among a list of work attributes. 
Professional growth opportunities 
Sense of financial security 
Satisfaction of making a research discovery 
Amount of freedom you feel you have to do your job 
Recognition from peers 
Recognition from superiors 
Collegiality of workplace 
Satisfaction from being a good teacher 
Table 6 shows the relative value of all the 
rewards and attributes as indicated by the number of 
points respondents at each institution distributed, on 
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average, th . d among e various awar s. Taken together, 
faculty at the merit pay institutions assigned tenure 
th
e highest average points (only non-tenured faculty 
were asked to assign points to tenure) among the 
rewards. A one semester leave of absence with pay and 
a lO percent merit salary increase tied for the second 
highest value, followed by promotion in rank, public 
recognition of outstanding teaching, and peer 
recognition in one's discipline. The main difference 
among the merit pay institutions was the #2 ranking 'MP 
2' f aculty gave to recognition from peers. 
Ratings for job attributes were similar for 
faculty across all merit pay institutions. 
Satisfaction from being a good teacher was most valued, 
followed by freedom in doing one's job, financial 
security, collegiality of the workplace, and 
Professional growth opportunities. 
Studies by Gustad (1960) and Eckert and Stecklein 
( 1961) found that faculty placed certain intrinsic 
aspects of their jobs ahead of salary as most 
rewarding. The results of the survey in this study 
revealed similar preferences. Caplan et al. ( 1975) 






different occupations and concluded that professors, 
more than all others, found intrinsic satisfactions in 
their work. 
TABLE 6. VALUE RATINGS OF REWARDS AND JOB ATTRIBUTES 
BY FACULTY, by Institution 
(Average score out of 100 points diatributed) 
REWARD 
Tenure* 
One Semester Leave of 
Absence with Pay 
10% Merit Salary Increase 
Promotion 
Pub1ic Recognition of 
Outstanding Teaching 
One Course Load Reduction 
for Semester 
Paar Recognition in Field 
$5,000 University Research 
Grant 
Two-Week Paid Leave for 
Professional Development 
Appointment to Profeaaional 
or Campus Honorary Position 
JOB ATTRIBUTB 
Satisfaction from Being a 
Good Teacher 
Amount of Freedom to do Job 
Financial Security 
Co1legia1ity of Workp1ace 
Professional Growth 
Opportunities 
Recognition from Peers 
Satiafaction of Making a 
Reaearch Discovery 











































































Almost a third of all faculty at the merit pay 
institutions gave merit pay the most points of the 
rewards. Just under half gave merit pay either the 
most or second most points. About 12 percent of the 
merit pay faculty did not assign any points of 
value to merit pay. Financial security was given the 
most or second most points among the list of job 
attributes by over half of the respondents. Nearly 23 
percent gave financial security the most points, while 
just over 10 percent assigned no points. 
Size and Range of Merit Awards Granted 
For 'MP l' and 'MP 2', the average merit pay award 
for all faculty ranged from a low of two percent to a 
high of four percent. 'MP l' had the broadest range of 
awards, from 1.5 11 percent. ' MP 2 ' had the 
narrowest range, only 4 percentage points. 
Public Disclosure 
There is little public disclosure of merit awards 
at the institutions studied. Only 'MP 2' discloses 
anything about merit pay, and then no more than the 
size of awards. None of the three merit pay 





Small wonder, then, that faculty were not fully 
informed about the size and distribution of merit pay 
awards. Table 7 reveals the accuracy of faculty's 
perceptions of merit pay distribution . Only about half 
of the faculty knew within 1 percentage point the 
average merit pay award granted. Only a few were more 
knowledgeable (within 10 percentage points o f the 
actual) about how many faculty members received merit 
pay. 
TABLE 7 . ACTUAL VERSUS FACULTY PERCEPTIONS 
OF MERIT AW.ARDS GRANTED 
(percent) 
MPl MP2 
Actua1 Avg. Merit Pay 2 4 
Facu1ty Perceptions: Those 
facu1ty r•Eorting: 
Actua1 13 17 
Be1ow actua1 7 3 3 
Above actua1 73 39 
Within+/- 1% of actua1 40 56 
Actual Percentage of 
Facu1ty Rcv'g Merit Pay 90 100 
Facu1ty Perceptions: Those 
faculty r•Eorting : 
Actual 0 61 
Below actua1 47 2 8 
Above actual 47 0 






REPORTED EFFORT - DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
The responses to the behavior questions (effort 
levels and direction of effort under various 
incentives) analyzed in terms of frequencies of 
responses revealed interesting overall trends in the 
data. 
Current Effort Levels 
Current effort levels were measured by the number 
of hours per week faculty designated in response to the 
question: 
Circle the number on the continuum that 
corresponds to the average number of hours per 
week you are fully engaged in your professional 
work. Include all aspects of your job, 
including teaching and research activities, 
campus and professional service, and grant 
applications. 
2s----3o----3s---4o---4s----so----55----6o----65 
or less or rrore 
Additionally, respondents were asked to allocate their 
work hours, as a percentage of total work time, among 
teaching, research, campus/community service, and 
service to profession. The average effort level for 
the merit pay institutions was 57 hours per week, and 
for 'No MP', the average was 51 hours (Table 8). On 
average, over half of all the faculty members' effort 
went into teaching or closely related activities, with 





institutions with merit pay, devoted to research and 
another fifth to campus and conununity service 
activities. 'No MP' faculty spent about twice as much 
time on campus and conununity service than on research 
activities. 








Service to Profession 
MP=Merit pay institution 
ALL NO 





















NO MP=Institution w/o merit pay 
Additional Effort for Specified Incentives 
Means were calculated for the additional hours per 
week the faculty respondents were willing to work 
overall for different rewards. Responses to the 
following question were in terms of additional hours 
per week: 
Assume that your institution will reward salary 
increases for meritorious performance. Consider 
each size reward listed below. How many more 
hours (if any) would you be willing to work to 
earn each? For example, in the first case, how 




0 to more than 10 additional 
for a 5 % merit salary increase? 
hours per 
5 % Merit Increase: 0----2----4----6----8---->10 
Additional hours per week 
10 % Merit Increase: 0----2----4----6----8---->10 
Additional hours per week 
15% Merit Increase: 0----2----4----6----8---->10 
Additional hours per week 
One-time bonus equal to 5% of your current salary: 
0----2----4----6----8---->10 
Additional hours per week 
As displayed in Table 9, the faculty at merit pay 
institutions were willing to work a marginally greater 
number of hours per week as the merit award grows from 
5% to 10% to 15%, but they were hardly willing to work 
more hours for the bonus. 
On average they would be willing to work . 7 more 
additional hours (42 minutes) per week for a 5% merit 
award, twice that amount (84 minutes) for a 10% merit 
award, and over three times as much (just over 2-1/4 
hours) for a 15% merit award. 
'No MP' faculty were, on average, willing to work 
the most for a 5% merit award and for a bonus . Their 
responses to 10% and 15 % merit pay awards closely 
resembled 'MP 1' and 'MP 2'. 
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TABLE 9. FACULTY 
Additional effort 
5% merit pay 
10% merit pay 
15% merit pay 
Bonus 
Additional effort 
5% merit pay 
10% merit pay 
15% merit pay 
Bonus 
Additional effort 
5% merit pay 
10% merit pay 
15% merit pay 
Bonus 
Additional effort 
5% merit pay 
10% merit pay 
15% merit pay 
Bonus 
Additional effort 
5% merit pay 
10% merit pay 
15% merit pay 
Bonus 
RESPONSES TO CHANGES IN BEHAVIOR 
FOR INCENTIVES 
ALL NO 
MP MPl MP2 MP3 MP 
(means)* 
for: 
• 7 . 9 . 9 . 4 1.1 
1. 4 1. 6 2.0 . 9 1. 9 
2.3 2.7 2.7 1. 3 2.5 
. 6 1. 3 . 3 . 4 2.5 
(medians)** 
in teaching for: 
1 2 1 1 1 
1 2 1 1 2 
1 2 1 1 2 
1 2 1 1 2 
in research for: 
1 2 1 1 2 
1 3 1.5 1.5 3 
2 4 1. 5 1.5 3 
1 2 1 1 3 
in campus/community service for: 




1 2 1 1 
1 2 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
in service to profession 
1 2 1 1 2 
1 3 1 1 2 
1.5 3 1 1 2 
1 2 1 1 2 
for: 
=============================================== = 
* Response equals additional hours per week 
** Scale of 1 to 5; l=no more effort; 3=somewhat more 
effort; S=significantly more effort 
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D' 
irection of Effort for Incentives 
To determine the effect of monetary incentives on 
the direction of faculty effort into various 
activities, faculty were asked the following question 
for each of f t · · t · t h · our ac ivi ies: eac ing, research, 
campus/community service, and service to profession. 
Assume that the pool of merit pay at your 
institution were earmarked for distinguished 
performance in [designated activity}. How would 
it affect your level of effort? Would your 
effort in [designated activity} increase or 
remain unchanged under each of the reward levels 
below? Respond for each reward level by circling 
a number on the continuums based on the following 
scale: 
1--------2--------3--------4--------s 
no more somewhat significantly 







One-time bonus 1------2------3------4------s 
(5% of salary) 
Appropriately for ordinal variables, medians were 
Calculated for the responses to these hypothetical 
s't i uations. Table 9 shows that for all merit 
institutions, there was little deviation from a median 
Of 1, signifying a willingness to devote no additional 
effort to any of the specified activities at all award 
lev-els. lt Were willing to commit The merit pay facu Y 





level, a median of 2, and into service to one's 





faculty showed a similar pattern to that 
although the former were willing to put 
forth somewhat more effort for the bonus. 
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Chapter 4 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
SUMMARY 
Research Questions 
This study examined faculty behavior under merit 
pay plans at four liberal arts colleges to determine 
whether there was a relationship between the level of 
faculty motivation and the degree to which 
institutional pay plans and individual expectancies 
conformed to Lawler's theory of an effective monetary 
incentive structure (Lawler 1971, 1981, 1990). The 
analysis of faculty behavior was based upon the four 
conditions Lawler prescribed as necessary if merit pay 
is to motivate performance. These conditions were: 
1. Individuals must believe that there is a 
valid link between good performance and 
merit pay. 
2. Individuals must place a high level of 
importance on monetary compensation. 
3. The size of the awards must be perceived by 
workers as relatively large. 
4. If the pay system does in fact reward good 
performance and is perceived as such by 
employees, the system should disclose 
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information about who receives awards and 
how much they receive. 
Using this theoretical basis, this study proposed 
the following questions: 
1. Is there an association between motivation 
levels among faculty subject to merit pay 
plans and the presence or absence of the 
theoretical conditions required to motivate? 
2. Are there other factors that are related to 
motivation levels among faculty under 
various pay plans? 
Methodology 
To answer these questions the study examined three 
merit pay institutions, characterizing their pay plans 
in terms of their conformance to Lawler' s theory. 
Additionally, one institution without merit pay was 
studied. Faculty motivation at these institutions was 
derived from faculty responses to survey questionnaires 
using self-reported level of effort as a proxy for the 
motivational behavior of the faculty. Current behavior 
patterns and expected behavior under proposed incentive 
pay scenarios constituted the data. 
The study data were provided from completed 






(targeted to selected 
83% response rate. 
Statistical correlation techniques were used to test 
for associations between the reported behavior of the 
faculty and the four conditions of Lawler's theory. 
Results 
Statistically significant results that addressed 
research question #1: Is there an association between 
reported faculty effort and the conditions of Lawler's 
theory?: 
• A positive relationship exists between the 
theory variable combining reward size and 
disclosure, and faculty effort in teaching and 
service to profession for all proposed reward 
levels. As the range of awards and public 
disclosure increased, faculty reported a 
willingness to increase effort in teaching and 
service to profession. 
Testing the four theory conditions separately resulted 
in the following significant associations: 
• As the size of the range of awards inc reased, 
faculty reported higher current effort l evel and 
increased willingness to devote additional effort 
toward teaching for a 10 percent bonus , and 
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toward service to profession for each level of 
merit award. 
• The stronger the faculty's perception of the 
strength of the pay-performance link the lower 
their reported willingness to devote additional 
effort toward teaching, research, and service to 
profession, and toward campus and community 
service for the two largest merit awards . 
• A positive relationship between the openness of 
the disclosure policy and faculty's current 
effort level, but no relationship between 
disclosure and faculty's willingness to exert 
additional effort for financial rewards. 
• No significant relationships between the 
individual's value of money and reported effort. 
In addition to analyzing the variables for 
significant associations that related directly to the 
theory, another aspect of the study explored whether 
other factors had some relation to the faculty's 
reported behavior (research question * 2) • 
Characteristics such as tenure, salary, age, and 
discipline, were examined for possible associat i ons 
with behavior. As salary levels increased, reported 
willingness to give additional effort to teaching and 
service to profession at all award levels went down. 
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Faculty members without tenure reported that they were 
inclined to work harder for merit and bonus rewards. 
As the percentage of faculty receiving merit pay 
and the average size of the merit awards at an 
institution increased, the current level of effort and 
the willingness to devote additional effort to service 
to profession decreased. This finding is qualified, 
however, by the inaccurate perceptions faculty had of 
the actual merit payments awarded to others. Faculty 
perceptions of the merit pay plan, as opposed to the 
actual merit awards given would have affect their 
reported effort. 
Each of the four conditions in Lawler' s theory 
were analyzed descriptively. The pay-performance 
relationship variable (theory condition fl) was 
determined from faculty perceptions of the importance 
of numerous professional activities in receiving 
various rewards. Effective teaching was considered by 
a majority of faculty as important in earning rewards. 
For non-financial awards, 'No MP' faculty expressed the 
strongest belief that performance was important to 
receiving the designated rewards. Aggregating the 
perceptions of the faculty from all four institutions, 
respondents classified most 






implying that faculty believe the determination of 
reward recipients is unpredictable with respect to 
one's performance. 
The faculty valued monetary rewards and financial 
security relatively high in importance (theory 
condition 12). Just under half ranked merit pay as 
either the first or second most valued reward. 
Financial security was ranked first or second by over 
half of the faculty. However, several intrinsic 
rewards and job attributes were also highly rated, 
including recognition, satisfaction from teaching, job 
freedom, and collegiality of the workplace. 
The range of merit awards granted (theory 
condition #3) ranged from 4 percentage points at 'MP 2' 
to 10 percentage points at 'MP 1'. 
The fourth condition of Lawler's theory, public 
disclosure of awards and recipients, was relatively 
limited at all three merit pay institutions. 'MP 1' 
and 'MP3' do not disclose the names of recipients or 
the sizes of rewards. 'MP 2' divulges the size of 
awards, but not who received them. 
The faculty responses to the behavior queries were 
also examined individually. To assess faculty 
motivation, the faculty were presented with 
hypothetical situations in which they would receive a 
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specified merit pay increment or a one time bonus equal 
to 10 percent of their salary. Faculty indicated how 
the prospect of such awards would affect their effort 
level. At the three merit pay institutions, faculty 
expressed a willingness to work an average of only .6 
to 2. 3 hours more per week as the incentive reward 
grows, and the least number of additional hours for the 
bonus. The 'No MP' faculty were, on average, willing 
to work the most for a 5% merit award (1.1 additional 
hours) and a bonus (2.5 additional hours), but they 
responded similarly to 'MP 1' and 'MP 2' on 10% and 15% 
merit pay awards. 
The effect of various incentive rewards on the 
direction in which faculty would spend their effort 
showed that as a whole, the faculty at the merit pay 
institutions signified a willingness to devote only a 
small amount of additional effort to any of the 
specified activities, whatever the award levels. They 
were willing to put a relatively higher level of effort 
into research and in service to one's profession at the 
15% merit level. 'MP 1' faculty indicated that they 
would be willing to put forth somewhat more effort than 
the other merit pay institutions in virtually all 
cases. 'MP 1' notably had the widest range of merit 
awards, the overall strongest reward-performance 
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perception, and the highest value assigned to money. 
'No MP' faculty were relatively more responsive to the 
bonus than were faculty at the merit pay institutions. 
CONCLUSIONS 
When considering the results of the study, it is 
important to account for the source and amount of data. 
This study focused on four institutions of a specific 
type. The results are based only on what faculty _gy 
they would do or would have done under various 
incentives, and not on what has actually occurred. 
Additionally, since many faculty members believe that 
they already work the maximum number of hours possible, 
they are unwilling to consider additional hours for any 
reason. 
Additionally, the environment of every institution 
affects faculty behavior in general, and their reaction 
to incentives more specifically. However, these 
factors are not often observable, tangible, or amenable 
to statistical analysis. Any discernible differences 
between responses among the faculty based on 
institutional affiliation will be included in the 
discussions that follow of the theory elements and the 
responses to the behavioral questions. 
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Test of the Theory 
The results of this study showed a weak 
application of Lawler's pay and motivation theory to 
liberal arts faculty. The faculty in this study 
exhibited no significant relationship between their 
expectancies regarding merit pay (the strength of the 
pay-performance relationship and value of pay, theory 
conditions #1 and #2) and their motivation in response 
to merit pay incentives. The combined institutional 
conditions of Lawler's theory, the size of awards and 
public disclosure (conditions #3 and f4), were 
positively associated with faculty effort in teaching 
and service to profession. That is, as the range of 
rewards and disclosure level increased, faculty were 
~illing to put greater effort into teaching and 
professional service for 5%, 10%, and 15% merit awards 
and a one time 10% bonus. Because of the small 
differences in the level of public disclosure among the 
institutions with merit pay, most of the effect of this 
relationship can be assumed to derive from the range of 
merit awards granted. The positive nature of the 
relationship between the size of merit pay awards and 
effort that resulted from these data was expected, 
assuming the validity of the theory. Higher stakes may 
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Prov-ide th e incentive that yields greater effort from 
faculty. 
Association of the theory's four conditions with 
faculty effort were also t t db l t · es e y corre a ing the four 
cond't· 
.l. ions separately against faculty's reported effort 
'\\Then Presented with monetary incentives. Two of the 
theory . conditions, the level of disclosure about merit 
recipients and the degree to which faculty value 
monet ary rewards, bore no significant relationship to 
the faculty's willingness to increase their effort for 
me · r.1.t pay or bonuses. The only theory conditions 
show.1· ng t t · · · · f · t · at · · th th s a istically signi ican associ ions wi e 
behav-ior variables were the size of the range of merit 
Pay awards and the strength of the perceived pay-
Performance relationship, although the latter had an 
uneJCp · t · ectedly negative associa ion. 
The variable for the range of merit awards 
demonstrated the expected results as regards current 
effort level and effort towards service to one's 
Profession. t he wider the range of merit That is, 
awards granted, signifying a supposedly greater 
recogn, t. and a reward of some i ion of performance 
financ· 1 . 'f' the more effort these faculty .1.a signi icance, 
members put into their jobs and the more effort they 
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were willing to put into service to their profession, 
but not for the other faculty activities. 
The perceived pay-performance relationship showed 
a statistically significant negative association with 
additional effort for pay incentives. Lawler' s theory, 
however, suggests that the stronger one's belief in the 
connection between good performance and rewards the 
more one is motivated to perform. The faculty sample 
in this study displayed the opposite behavior. That 
is, as the belief in the pay-performance relationship 
strengthened, faculty showed less willingness to 
increase their effort in response to offers of monetary 
rewards for good performance. This was an unexpected 
outcome, and, absent 





behavior, no relationship would have been more expected 
than one that was negatively significant. 
Another explanation may lie in an examination of 
the perceived pay-performance relationship. The 
strongest pay-performance link was between effective 
teaching and merit pay. Eliminating this relationship 
from the pay-performance part of the questionnaire 
significantly weakens the overall perception of the 
pay-performance relationship. Faculty at these 
institutions are enthusiastic about teaching regardless 
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Of th 
e monetary rewards, as evidenced by the high value 
resp 
ondents placed on the satisfaction that derives 
from be . 
ing a good teacher (Table 6). Therefore, the 
st
rength of the pay-performance variable, attributed in 
large part t th . . o e effective teaching-pay relationship 
Would not 
necessarily translate into additional effort 
gi"ITen the prospect of merit pay. 
Deci (1972) theorized that intrinsic and extrinsic 
reward 
s are interrelated and, more importantly here, 
that f 0 cusing on extrinsic rewards actually decreases 
intr;n · · lf ... sic interest in the task itse . This may 
e~Plain in part why faculty are not inclined to commit 
more effort, as teachers, for more money. The goal of 
monetary rewards may be inimical to the intrinsic 
rewards guaranteed from teaching. 
The general skepticism about the relationship 
between pay and other faculty activities could, in 
.fact , help explain the negative relationship between 
Perceived pay-performance and effort. Festinger (1957) 
theorized that motivation levels are the result of 
Perceived inequities in the incentive plan. Workers 
may adjust to these inequities by reducing work effort 
and making fewer contributions. The data from this 
study suggest that there may indeed be feelings of 
inequities among faculty . Aside from the teaching-
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reward relationship, faculty do not see a close 
relationship between pay and performance. In addition, 
faculty overestimated rewards (see Table 7). Under 
these circumstances, where workers view the reward 
system as unfair, Festinger posits that employees 
reduce their contributions to the organization. 
Interestingly, the service to profession variable 
was the one activity with any significant positive 
(increased effort) relationships resulting from the 
separate testing of the four theory conditions. This 
result probably stems from the nature and role of 
professional service to other faculty priorities. Of 
the four activities addressed in this study--teaching, 
research, campus and community service, and service to 
profession--service to profession may be the only one 
where faculty could envision making additional effort, 
as the faculty allocated the least time to this area 
(see Table 8). Thus, any prospect of rewards for 
performance that could increase effort might occur in 
an area such as service to profession where there is 
some margin for increased effort. 
These tests of association between the four 
conditions of Lawler' s theory and the reported behavior 
from faculty question and weaken the validity of 
Lawler's theory, at least as applied in these 
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particular academic settings. Whether this is because 
there are other factors at play in motivating faculty, 
or because these faculty simply did not respond to 
merit pay incentives remains speculative. Other 
theories of pay and motivation were reviewed in an 
effort to further explain faculty behavior. 
Other Theoretical Explanations 
Several motivation theorists raise the issue of 
intrinsic rewards as important motivators. The 
implications of MacGregor's 
motivation, · based on Maslow' s 
(1960) research on 
hierarchy of needs, 
suggest that, while faculty value financial rewards , 
they also place great importance on the higher level, 
intrinsic needs for achievement, growth, and 
recognition. MacGregor contended that basic and higher 
level needs are equally important as motivators. Thus, 
merit pay alone may not exhibit a strong enough 
motivational impact to significantly affect faculty 
behavior. 
Herzberg (1959) viewed external rewards, such as 
merit pay, as factors that prevent dissatisfaction 
among workers, whereas intrinsic rewards, the key to 
motivation, satisfied workers. McKeachie (1979) agreed 
that academicians, especially, are more apt to respond 
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to intrinsic rewards. Inasmuch as the faculty in the 
present study did not respond strongly to the prospect 
of merit pay, one could conjecture that intrinsic 
rewards are the more powerful motivators. The values 
expressed by faculty attest to the importance placed on 
intrinsic rewards. 
Other research has suggested that the process of 
giving rewards, the development of evaluative criteria 
and the assessment of individual faculty performance, 
underlies motivation. McGeoch and Irion ( 1952) focused 
on the perceived reward-performance link and concluded 
that it was the workers' perceptions of how their pay 
was determined that dictated the success of incentives. 
The concept of procedural justice, which 
emphasizes how rewards are determined rather than the 
actual distribution, has often been used to explain 
reaction to rewards. Research has shown that the 
perceived fairness of a reward payment depends not only 
on the size of the reward, but also the fairness of the 
procedure used to determine it (Greenberg 1987). For 
college faculty these procedures include the extent of 
their involvement in the pay decisions and how faculty 
job performance is evaluated . The fairness of 
procedures is especially relevant to those who receive 
low payments. Given an unfair distribution, 
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individuals who receive relatively small payments are 
more apt to view these payments as unfair than are 
those who receive large payments. Greenberg's research 
also suggested that procedures may matter most to 
people when they result in negative outcomes. His 
research also indicated, however, that as long as the 
procedures for distributing the awards were viewed as 
fair, even those individuals receiving low payments 




determine which procedural factors, 
were the cause of the perceived 
Seldin ( 1984) focused on approaches to evaluations 
of faculty performance and found that the faculty's 
perceived fairness of the evaluation process was 
critical to its success. Based on research of faculty, 
Seldin suggested that in order to ensure the perception 
of fairness: 1) evaluation standards and criteria 
should be clearly conununicated to faculty, and 2) the 
faculty's confidence in the evaluation system can be 
strengthened through faculty participation in the 
development of evaluation standards and criteria. The 
procedures used in developing a faculty evaluation 
program were considered as important or more important 
to faculty than the actual criteria used. 
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Given that faculty in two of the three merit pay 
institutions in this study worked under a plan without 
formally defined categories of achievement, where 
administrators selected both the criteria and the 
recipients of merit, faculty may feel alienated from 
the process. This factor does not necessarily explain 
motivation of faculty, since the faculty at the 
institution where merit categories were defined and 
where faculty participated in determining the criteria 
did not show a stronger response to merit pay than 
faculty at the other merit pay institutions. 
Discussion of Individual Theory Conditions 
Despite the inability of the data to support 
Lawler's theory in an academic setting, the analysis of 
the four theory conditions separately produced some 
interesting results regarding faculty attitudes toward 
incentives. 
Pay-Performance Relationship. For those 
activities that faculty perceived to be valuable in 
earning rewards, teaching was viewed as very important 
by virtually all. This result is highly predictable 
for liberal arts colleges, but it is likely that a 
different result would have occurred at researc h 
universities. 
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Fenker (1977) also found differences among faculty 
perceptions of the reward-performance link, although 
respondents at the large university in his sample 
perceived research as highly rewarded and teaching less 
so. The findings of both studies are consistent with 
the missions of the respective institutions studied. 
An imbalance in the weight assigned to activities 
to evaluate performance can create problems in faculty 
perceptions of the credibility of the system (Beer et 
al. 1984). The faculty in this study, while confident 
that teaching was important to rewards, were far less 
convinced that other activities influenced the 
allocation of rewards. For most of the enumerated 
activities, the respondents rated the relationship 
between performance and rewards as 'neither important 
nor unimportant' or 'unimportant' This may indicate 
that faculty believed that rewards were based on only 
select facets of their overall performance. 
Value of Pay. The respondents in this study 
generally valued pay, although, as a profession, 
faculty are often less interested in money and more 
focused on intrinsic rewards. Monetary rewards and 
financial security had definite appeal, as indicated by 
the high value assigned to merit pay and the financial 
aspects of their jobs (Table 6). 
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However, the faculty also valued highly intrinsic 
rewards. Lawler' s theory does not incorporate the value 
of intrinsic rewards or consider their relative 
importance to external rewards. While an individual 
may value money highly, some intrinsic rewards may be 
more highly valued, and thus have greater motivational 
impact. 
Size of Merit Awards. The size of merit awards 
(in this study, the range between lowest and highest 
awards) proved to have the expected positive 
association with additional effort. Given higher 
education's current fiscal constraints, one might 
conjecture that 'MP 1', which offered very high merit 
awards, gave those awards to relatively few people, 
while 'MP 2' distributed smaller awards to a greater 
number of individuals. As a result, probably more 
faculty at 'MP 1' felt that they did not get what they 
deserved which, in turn, produced a higher level of 
dissatisfaction among faculty and a perception that 
performance and rewards were not tightly linked. In 
all but one job activity, the faculty at 'MP 1' rated 
the link between pay and performance as unimportant 
more often than did 'MP 2' . Thus, while one element of 
Lawler' s theory, large reward size, applied to the 
behavior of this faculty, it could create a negative 
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effect on another condition of the theory, the 
perceived pay-performance relationship. 
Disclosure. This study was inconclusive regarding 
the validity of public disclosure of merit pay as a 
prerequisite for a successful incentive pay plan. The 
faculty at the institution that had the most open 
disclosure plan were somewhat better informed about the 
size and number of awards than were faculty at the 
college that revealed no information. Still, only a 
little more than half of the faculty at the former 
institution could accurately state within 1 percentage 
point the actual size of the average merit award 
granted; less than two-thirds knew within 10 percentage 
points the proportion of the faculty that actually 
received merit pay . Evangelauf (1984) found that 
university faculty least informed about the pay plan 
had the most negative reaction to merit pay. 
Weakness of Behavior Responses 
The faculty's responses to the behavior questions 
revealed some expected trends, such as a willingness to 
work more hours as the size of the merit award at stake 
increased. Among the merit pay institutions the bonus 
was the least attractive of the financial awards 
presented . Interestingly, the 'No MP' faculty were 
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willing to put 
the proposed 
in the greatest additional effort for 
financial incentives. The non-merit 
institution faculty were more responsive to bonuses 
than the merit pay institutions, responding about 
equally to the bonus as to the merit awards (Table 9). 
This might suggest that faculty under merit pay plans 
want a reward that builds their base salary and fear 
that bonuses will drain the pool of merit funds and not 
have the same long-term payoff. Faculty on campuses 
without merit pay incentives, on the other hand, 
perhaps do not discriminate as much among the types of 
financial incentives and may be less cognizant of the 
long-term differences between bonuses and additions to 
base salary. 
Perhaps familiarity with a merit pay system in 
practice breeds a more skeptical attitude because it 
has not proven to be as equitable or 
operation as the faculty expect in 
Expectations are higher than reality. 
people believe they are meritorious. 
as fruitful in 
the abstract. 
In general, all 
The faculty at 
'No MP' ma~ want to assume that the incentive pay 
system will be just by rewarding them with a fair 
amount of merit pay. Significant research evidence, 
however, points to a wide gap between the promise and 
the reality of a pay-for-performance system (Lawler 
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1971, McGeoch and Irion 1952, Hackman 1970, Fenker 
1977, Beer et al. 1984) The difference between 
faculty at the merit pay colleges and 'No MP', as 
regards additional hours, highlights the low 
expectations among faculty experienced with merit pay. 
Everyone may agree that merit pay is a good idea, but 
those that actually have experience with it have become 
skeptical. The results here between the 'No MP' 
faculty and the merit pay faculty indicate that the 
expectations for merit pay plans can be easily set too 
high, and should not be the primary instrument for 
motivating faculty. 
The relative magnitude of the additional effort 
faculty were willing to undertake for financial 
incentives was small; many faculty maintained that the 
presence of financial incentives would not change their 
behavior at all. Over half of the respondents would 
devote no additional hours to their work week if merit 
pay incentives were provided. For the various levels 
of incentive rewards proposed, the faculty were willing 
to work, on average, only 24 more minutes per week for 
the lowest merit award (5%) and at most, 2-1/4 hours 
for the highest award (15%). Just over two additional 
hours out of an average 57-hour week represents a 
relatively weak response at best. 
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One explanation fo·r the weak responses may be that 
liberal arts faculty simply are not very motivated by 
merit pay incentives. The tepid response to incentives 
c ould also be due to perceptions that faculty already 
maximize the efforts they put into their jobs and 
therefore cannot increase effort, no matter what 
incentives are available. One might also wonder 
whether faculty overrated the effort they currently 
devote to their jobs (57 hours/week average). Yet, 
their perception of their workload as very heavy may be 
as important as the reality when it comes to responding 
with more effort for merit pay. 
The data that indicated the direction of faculty 
effort toward specific activities were consistent in 
magnitude to overall effort--a small amount of 
additional effort, on average, for the targeted 
activities. For all four activities that were proposed 
as targets for merit pay, around half of the faculty 
would exert no additional effort. Interestingly, 
research was the activity that yielded the greatest 
response for additional effort. Since research is not 
the priority of liberal arts colleges or their 
faculties, perhaps financial incentives are needed to 
spur additional efforts. Little or no additional 










a cul ty, was consistently the overall response, as 
most f 
acuity probably believe that they are directing 
max · 
imum attention to teaching. Additionally, liberal 
arts 
faculty are more inclined to put significant 
effort 
into teaching because this activity yields 
intri · 
nsic satisfactions with or without the prospect of 
merit pay. 
Faculty not under a merit pay plan assigned 
9'reate . 
r importance to public service and service to 
one' 
s Profession as they relate to receiving rewards, 
but th;s 
~ could be due in part to the particular campus 
Climate. The faculty at the non-merit pay institution 
d' 
ict not rate any of the professional activities listed 
as 
Unimportant in receiving non-financial rewards, 
i
nd
icating a greater belief in the reward-performance 
link 
'MP l' faculty expressed the greatest amount of 
actct· 
i tional effort for rewards in all areas· 'MP 1' 
also had the widest range of merit awards granted, the 
highest reward-performance scores, and the 
highest value assigned to money, all conditions which 
support the premises of the theory. 
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Relationship of Faculty Characteristics and 
Institutional Factors to Faculty Effort 
The analysis of faculty characteristics 
(demographic variables), such as age, rank, field, 
salary, etc., as related to faculty response to merit 
pay, exhibited some associations. While none were 
significant enough to alter the conclusions about the 
application of the theory to faculty motivation, some 
of the results suggest the potential strength of merit 
pay as an incentive for different faculty. 
The negative association exhibited between salary 
level and additional effort towards teaching and 
service to profession probably occurred because 
individuals who are already relatively highly paid are 
less interested in additional money. Because salary 
relates to rank and tenure, these factors may also 
affect incentive response. Indeed, the test of 
association revealed that those faculty members without 
tenure were inclined to work harder for specified 
rewards, perhaps in order to strengthen their case for 
future tenure, a highly valued reward among untenured 
faculty (Table 6) . As an incentive for higher salaried 
and tenured faculty, merit pay may be less powerful 
because these individuals are more satisfied 
financially and feel no pressure to perform in order to 

















to exert greater levels of additional 
effort for merit d . . 
rewar s specifically in teaching may 
be attributable t l · · o ess cynicism about the efficacy of 
Pay Plan 
administration because ego allows them to 
ackno l 
wedge that they could still improve. 
The negative association that resulted between the 
Percentage of faculty receiving merit pay at the 
inst· 
itution and faculty effort might be attributed to 
th
e faculty's expectation that if most people receive 
rewards, there is not a great distinction between those 
Who Perform very well and those who do not. For 
inst· 
itutions with higher average merit pay, however, 
0 ne · · · · h might have expected a positive association wit 
effort because individuals would expend greater effort 
knowing the rewards are greater. The resulting 
association was, however, negative. This may mean that 
llleri t pay goes to research and teaching and dampens 
enthusiasm for service as a result. There are problems 
in a f association using ssessing the true nature o any 
av-er ntage of faculty receiving age merit pay and perce 
Ille · b t the true size of rit due to faculty perceptions a ou 
the d to others. Significant 
merit awards grante 
Portions of the 
~naccurately indicated the faculty ... 
av-erage merit award at their institution, 
thereby 
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lessening the validity of the relationship between the 
actual average merit pay and effort levels. 
The demographics of the faculty and the 
institutional factors therefore proved to have little 
correlation with the faculty's reported behavior 
patterns. Fenker (1977) found that faculty 
demographics did not significantly affect faculty 
perceptions of the current incentive structure. 
Likewise, these factors did not significantly 
contribute to the explanation of the application of 
Lawler's theory or faculty motivation in this study. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND RESEARCH 
Administration of Faculty Merit Pay Plans 
A number of implications for the implementation 
and administration of faculty merit pay plans emerge 
from this study of pay and motivation theory. While 
the results are based on a small sample and apply to a 
specific type of institution, the patterns that 
appeared in the faculty responses, as well as 
additional comments provided by faculty, indicated some 
problems and misconceptions about merit pay plans that 
must be addressed to improve faculty incentive 
structures. 
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Larger Merit Rewards Have a Greater Motivational 
Impact . Faculty placed a relatively high value on 
monetary rewards and financial security. The data also 
showed a greater willingness by faculty at the 
institution granting the largest merit awards to exert 
more effort. Merit awards that are so small as to be 
financially insignificant will not have as much of a 
motivational impact. If only small rewards are granted 
to all recipients they could be potentially received 
more negatively than no merit pay awards because the 
small amount will be viewed as trivial, insignificant, 
and less than deserved. Resentment among workers may 
result. 
If faculty members are to be motivated by money, 
the increase to salaries must make a noticeable 
financial difference so that the reward is deemed worth 
pursuing. Small merit awards should be granted to 
individuals whose performance justifies such an award, 
but sizeable awards should also be attainable by 
faculty whose performance warrants it. Given limited 
funds and the positive association between large awards 
and effort, larger awards to fewer individuals would 
have more of a motivational impact than smaller awards 
to many. 
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Intrinsic Rewards Show Potential as Faculty 
Motivators. Although faculty rated merit pay and 
financial security highly, they also expressed strong 
interest in intrinsic rewards. Their relatively weak 
response to merit pay, as illustrated by their 
unwillingness to exert much extra effort given the 
prospect of merit pay rewards suggest that merit pay 
alone will not provide significant motivational impact. 
Since merit pay incentives did not explain much of 
faculty motivation in this study, other incentives, 
such as intrinsic rewards could be stronger forces that 
meet the motivational needs of a broader range of 
individuals. 
From the responses, many faculty appear to be 
reluctant to admit that they could be motivated to work 
harder than they already do if money is used as the 
incentive. Indeed, approximately half of the faculty 
indicated that they would not change their behavior at 
all for monetary incentives. Whether valid or not, 
faculty would like to believe that they are not highly 
motivated by extrinsic rewards. It has been argued 
that intrinsic rewards take precedence in academia 
(McKeachie 1979, Miller 1988). While certainly true 
for some individuals, this study concluded that money 
is important to faculty as revealed by the high ratings 
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they placed on merit pay. 
that i ntrinsic rewards, 
These data also indicated 
such as collegiality, 
satisfaction from teaching, and job freedom, ranked 
high in importance as well. 
While Lawler's theory of pay and motivation was 
not found to apply to this sample of liberal arts 
faculty, some of the other theories discussed indicate 
that the role of intrinsic rewards may have a more 
significant role in explaining faculty motivation. 
Thus, a comprehensive faculty incentive plan would 
include both extrinsic and intrinsic rewards, without 
heavy reliance on merit pay to impact faculty effort. 
This would limit the power of monetary rewards to 
undermine intrinsic motivation and potentially reduce 
motivation. Administration sends a message about what 
is valued at the institution by holding up both 
extrinsic and intrinsic rewards as the outcome of 
exemplary performance, rather than exclusively 
emphasizing monetary rewards. A mix of incentive types 
also meets a variety of reinforcement needs that result 
from differences among individual valuations of 
rewards. 
The relatively stronger response to proposed merit 
pay incentives from the faculty not currently subject 
to a merit pay plan further indicates that expectations 
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of the potential motivational impact of merit pay may 
be higher than the reality. Thus, by focusing 
primarily on merit pay to motivate faculty, an 
institution is unlikely to achieve fully the objectives 
of its incentive plan. 
Merit Pay Can Have an Impact on the Direction of 
Faculty Effort. These data showed that faculty 
responded to merit pay more strongly for some 
activities than others. There was virtually no impact 
on the additional amount of teaching. Faculty were 
more willing to devote additional effort to service to 
one's profession, and research to a somewhat lesser 
extent, for merit pay. For liberal arts faculty, 
teaching may be valued more for its intrinsic value. 
Thus, faculty are less responsive to extrinsic rewards. 
For activities that do not have as high a priority for 
the faculty and the college, merit pay may have a 
greater motivational impact. Merit pay awards directed 
at specific activities, as opposed to overall 
performance, might be a more meaningful application of 
the incentives and may allow the institution to use 
merit pay to achieve more specific objectives. Because 
the faculty in this study demonstrated a willingness to 
work only a relatively small number of additional hours 
for merit pay, its usefulness as an incentive may lie 
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--
more in the direction of faculty effort rather than the 
~ of overall effort. 
Qisclosure Policy Regarding Faculty Merit Awards 
Did N 
-=-®t Affect Faculty Response to Merit Pay. This 
stucty was inconclusive regarding the relationship 
betwe 
en motivation and knowledge about the size and 
re · Cl.pients of merit pay. While it is clearly 
speculat· 
l. ve that the weak perception faculty have about 
the 
relationship between performance and rewards 
reflects some dissatisfaction with the incentive 
system, a . policy of more openness regarding merit pay 
information could improve that perception, if 
informat · h t th ion demonstrates to faculty t a e pay-
Perf ormance link is strong. 
Qifferences in Faculty Characteristics Affect Few 
~nses to Incentives. The faculty in this study 
With higher salaries and those with tenure indicated a 
Weaker response to proposed merit incentives, further 
supporting the importance of not relying heavily on 
merit one might speculate 
pay to motivate all faculty. 
that if this is true £or monetary incentives it may 
• 
of rewards, as illustrated also be t rue for other types 
by Fenker (1977). 
Periodic Assessments of Merit Pa 
plans Ma Reveal 
~eed for Reevaluation of the 
system. It is 
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difficult for 
an administration to be fully aware of 
faculty discontent 
regarding pay practices. The 
Of this study would hardly assure actm · 
l.nistrators 
incentive. 
that merit pay offers a strong 
The merit pay plans have been in place for 
t-we1 
Ve Years and more, yet the faculty indicated a 
Sign . f ' 
.1. .1.cant degree of dissatisfaction with their 
inst· 
.1.tution's current plan and a degree of 
nonre 
sponsiveness to the concept of merit pay 
incent · .1.ves. 
Even though general discontent may be sensed among 
the f 
acuity, it is important to understand the specific 
Problems and sensitivities and then attempt to 
determine the source of the problems. Periodic 





to reveal problems and to important 
effective incentive system. 
One Used in this study, can such as the 
Unco or misconceptions about the Ver disillusionment 
mer · t 
.1. Pay plan and its effects· A merit pay plan ought 
not co t . , thout the administration n .1.nue year after year wi 




e ndations for Further Research 
This 
study concentrated on one theory of 
rnot iv-at . 
ion and pay as it applied to a specific type and 
of institutions. A number of unanswered 
questions 
remain that can be addressed through further 
Faculty incentives, particularly merit pay, 
is at · 
imely issue that warrants significant research. 
Since this study focused specifically on 
inct 
ependent liberal arts institutions, an obvious 
e-"tension of the research would be to examine the use 
Of merit 
ectucat· ion 
pay at other classifications of higher 
institutions. Studies of research 
Un' 
l. v-ersi· ti· es · ff t are likely to yield di eren results than 
a 
st
udy of liberal arts faculty. 
Lawler's theory itself could be revised or 
e-"tended to include an examination of other conditions 
hyp0thesized to be necessary for merit pay to motivate 
faculty. of i'ntrinsic rewards in The strength 
Particular could be examined in conjunction with the 
e-"terna1 rewards aspect of Lawler' s theory (Deci 1972), 
rather than . . . . . and extrinsic rewards viewing intrinsic 
Separ t wei' ght of activities evaluated a ely. The mix and 
rewards might also be considered. 
Also, the 
P r ocess e than just the of granting rewards, mor 
di h s potential for 
Sclosure aspect of Lawler' s theory a 
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in-depth examination. How does this process affect 
faculty perceptions and motivation? 
A c loser examination of one of the conditions of 
Lawler's theory, the perceived pay-performance 
relationship, is warranted because of its importance to 
pay and motivation research and because of the 
ambiguous role it played in the results of this study. 
An understanding of why faculty are disillusioned with 
the merit pay process would be useful in determining 
what it is about the administration of these plans that 
c louds the pay-performance linkage. Possible sources 
of employee disenchantment could be examined, such as 
the politics surrounding allocation of awards, the 
inaccurate perception of award sizes, excessively low 
c aps on merit pay, or the plan's clash with the de 
facto value system of the institution. 
The different goals of merit pay as an incentive 
could be a focus for continued research. Do the 
objectives of the plan's administrc;3.tors match the 
perceptions of the faculty? It would be useful to have 
both administrators and faculty rate the perceived 
performance-reward link. A study of merit pay plan 
objectives might also include the examination of the 
impact of incentives designed to direct faculty toward 
specific activities. 
127 
The factors involved in the development of merit 
pay reward evaluation criteria could be studied from 
several perspectives: Who determines the criteria? 




How are they communicated to 
factors related to faculty 
and satisfaction with the pay plan, and 
ultimately, to their motivation? 
that procedural justice plays an 
individuals' perceptions of the 
Research has shown 
important role in 
fairness of their 
payments. How might this affect their reactions to 
perceived injustices in the merit pay plan? 
Time series research could be conducted in ways to 
reveal changes or trends in behavior of faculty 
subjected to merit pay plans. One approach might be to 
assess behavior patterns at an institution before and 
after the implementation or significant revision of a 
merit pay incentive plan to determine whether there are 
notable shifts in faculty behaviors and attitudes. 
Additionally, faculty behavior could be monitored 
over time, comparing individual behavior before and 
after receiving a merit pay award. Faculty behavior 
could be compared between individuals who received 
large awards and those who received only nominal or no 
merit awards at the same institution. This has been 
done at a large university (Ehli 1986), but a similar 
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e x amination at a liberal arts col l ege could reveal 
whether the motivational results of merit pay match the 
reported perc eptions of the faculty. 
Not only other categories of institutions, but 
o ther types of rewards should be investigated to 
c ompare the magnitude of motivational impact. In this 
study, merit pay' s impact was very low, but it would be 
useful t o see where merit pay stands in relation to 
other incentives. 
Given the severe financial restrictions currently 
facing higher education institutions, research into 
non-monetary incentives would be valuable. A more in-
depth examination of intrinsic rewards for faculty 
would prove beneficial in light of the weak response 
faculty in this study gave to extrinsic rewards. 
Specialized studies on non-monetary incentives offer an 
a bundant source of needed research that could help 
determine the appropriate mix of faculty intrinsic and 




A. MERIT PAY INSTITUTIONS 
To Faculty Respondent: 
You recently received the attached questionnaire 
regarding faculty incentives. If you have. not yet 
completed it, would you please take a few minutes to 
complete it and return it in the attached stamped and 
addressed envelope. If you have already done so, thank 
you very much for your participation. 
DIRECTIONS: 
The following questionnaire is part of a study on 
faculty incentive plans. Some of the questions concern 
the current reward system at your institution, your 
personal views on various aspects of your job, and your 
current work patterns. Your responses to other 
questions will require that you make some assumptions 
about how you would react to various reward systems. 
In this study the term "merit pay" is the percentage 
increment that accrues to one's base salary in addition 
to or beyond any cost-of-living allowance provided to 
all faculty members, and is based on individual 
contributions. 
All questionnaires ARE TO BE ANSWERED ANONYMOUSLY and 
all responses WILL REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL both in the 
final study report and from any other individuals at 
your institution. 
Please return the completed questionnaire in the 
attached stamped envelope. Thank you very much for 
your assistance in this study. 
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l . In your opinion, at your institution, how direct ~s 
the relationship between three kinds of rewar~s. (merit 
pay, public recognition, promotion) and specific work 
activities? Circle the number from the scale that 
indi~a~es the importance of these activiti~s ~o 
receiving the specified reward, not as you think it 
~hould be, but as you perceive the situation at your 
institution. For example, if you feel there i~ a very 
strong relationship between effective teaching and 
;eceiving merit pay (i.e., that effective teaching is 
~ ery important' to receiving merit pay), you .wou~d 
c ircle 5 for the first response below; if you think it 
has very little or no importance to your receiving the 
reward, circle 1. 





neither I important 
nor unimportant 
a. Merit Pay Increase 
Effective teaching 1 2 3 4 
5 
Scholarly publication 1 2 3 4 
5 
Re c eipt of external funds 1 2 3 4 
5 
Service on campus committee 1 2 3 4 5 
Service to profession 1 2 3 4 5 
Public service 1 2 3 4 5 
b . Public RecogBition* 
Effective teaching 1 2 3 4 5 
Scholarly publication 1 2 3 4 5 
Receipt of external funds 1 2 3 4 5 
Service on campus committee 1 2 3 4 5 
Service to profession 1 2 3 4 5 
Public service 1 2 3 4 5 
* Inc~u?es f o rmal recognition b y t he instit ut ion in t he f o rm o f 
c ertificate s, public anno unc ements o f a c hiev ements n on-monetary 
a wards o f corrune d t ' f · ' n a i o n o r o utstanding teaching, research, and 
service. 
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C. Promotion in Rank 
Effect ive teaching 1 2 3 4 5 
Sch o larly publication 1 2 3 4 5 
Re c eipt o f e xternal funds 1 2 3 4 5 
Serv ice on campus committee 1 2 3 4 5 
Service to profession 1 2 3 4 5 
Public service 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Distribute 100 points among the following ten 
rewards according to their importance to you. Not 
e v ery reward needs to be assigned points, but the total 
points for all ten rewards (nine for tenured faculty) 
should add up to 100. 
Promotion in rank 
One semester leave of absence with pay 
Tenure (to be scored by non-tenured individuals 
only) 
Ten percent merit salary increase 
Public recognition of outstanding teaching 
One course load reduction for a semester 
Appointment to professional or campus honorary 
position (e.g., journal editor) 
$5,000 university research grant 
Two-week paid leave for professional development 
Peer recognition in discipline 
Below is a list of eight attributes people value about 
their jobs. Distribute 100 points among the list of 
eight attributes according to how much you value each 
in your job: 
Professional growth opportunities 
Sense of financial security 
Satisfaction of making a research discovery 
Amount of freedom you feel you have to do your job 
Recognition from peers 
Recognition from superiors 
Collegiality of workplace 
Satisfaction from being a good teacher 
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3 · Circle the number on the continuum that corres~o~fs 
to the average number of hours per week you are u ty 
engaged in your professional work. Include all aspec ~ 
of your job including teaching and researc 
activities, ca;pus and professional service, and grant 
applications. 
25 ----3o----3s----4o----4s----so----ss----6o---- 65 
or less or more 
4 · Assume that your institution will reward salary 
· 'd ach increases for meritorious performance. Consi ere 
size reward listed below. How many~ hours (if any) 
would you be willing to work to earn each? For 
example, in the first case, how many~ hours would 
you be willing to work (from O to more than 10 
<;1dditional hours per week) for a 5% merit salary 
increase? (Circle a number on the continuum for each 
award level.) 
5 % Merit Increase: o-----2-----4-----6-----8----->10 
Additional hours per week 
l0% Merit Increase: o-----2-----4-----6-----8----->10 
Additional hours per week 
l5% Merit Increase: o-----2-----4-----6-----8----->10 
Additional hours per week 
Ona-time bonus equal to 5% of your current salary: 
0-----2-----4-----6-----a----->10 
Additional hours per week 
S. Distribute 100 points among the activities listed 
below to reflect the proportion of your time you 
devoted to each during the past year. 
Teaching, preparing for class, advising students 
Research, writing articles/books/conference 
presentations, grant proposals 
___ Campus/Community Service, time spent preparing and 
serving on committees 
Service to profession or discipline 
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6. (a) Assume that the pool of merit pay at your 
institution were earmarked for distinguished 
performance in teaching related activities. How would 
it affect your level of effort? Would your effort in 
teaching activities increase or remain unchanged under 
each of the reward levels below? Respond for each 
reward level by circling a number on the continuums 
based on the following scale: 







5% Merit l--------2--------3--------4--------5 
10% Merit l--------2--------3--------4--------5 
15% Merit l--------2--------3--------4--------5 
One-time bonus l--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(5% of salary) 
(b) Assume that the pool of merit pay at your 
institution were earmarked for distinguished 
performance in research activities. How would it affect 
your level of effort in research activities? Respond 
f o r each reward level using the continuum scale used in 
6 ( a) • 
5% Merit l--------2--------3--------4--------5 
10% Merit l--------2--------3--------4--------5 
15% Merit l--------2--------3--- - ----4--------5 
One-time bonus l--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(5% of salary) 
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(c) Assume that the pool of merit pay . at , your 
· d' tinguished institution were earmarked for is . . . 
performance in campus and community service a~ti vi ti7s · 
How would it affect your level of effort in ~ervice 
activities? Respond for each reward level using the 










(d) Assume that the pool of merit pay at your 
institution were earmarked for distinguished 
performance in service to one's profession or 
~iscipline. How would it affect your level of effort 
.1.n service to your profession? Respond for each reward 
level using the continuum scale used in 6(a). 
5% Merit 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
10% Merit l--------2--------3--------4--------5 
15% Merit 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
One-time bonus l--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(5% of salary) 
: · What do you think was the average percentage 
increase for merit--exclusive of cost of living--for 
faculty in your department in 1990-91? ___ % 
What percentage of the faculty in your department do 
you think received some merit pay? ___ % 
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Demographic Information 
What is your rank? Assistant_ Associate_ Full 
Do you have tenure? Yes How long? years No -- -
~~;tis your age? <30 30-39_ 40-49 50-60 
How m . any years have you been at your present 
inst·t J.. ution? ___ years 
How ma / · ·t f ny years have you been a college un1vers1 y 
aculty member? years 
What is your field or discipline? ___________ _ 
What is your current salary level? <$30,000 
$ 3 0,000-49,000 $50,000-69,000 __ $70,000-100,000= 
>$100,000 
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NON-MERIT PAY INSTITUTION 
To Faculty Respondent: 
The foll · · · · t of a study on fa . owing questionnaire is par . 
culty incentive plans. Some of the questions concern 
the current reward system at your institution and your 
c~rre~t work patterns. Your responses to o~her 
q estions will require that you make some assumptions 
about how you would react to various reward systems. 
~n this study the term "merit pay" is the percentage 
increment that accrues to one's base salary in addition 
to or beyond any cost-of-living allowance provided to 
all faculty members and is based on individual 
contributions. ' 
All questionnaires ARE TO BE ANSWERED ANONYMOUSLY and 
;~l responses WILL REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL both in the 
inal . study report and from any other individuals at 
your institution. 
Please return the completed questionnaire in the 
a~tached stamped envelope. Thank you very much for 
y ur assistance in this study. 
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l. In your opinion, at your institution, how direct ~s 
the relationship between three kinds of rewar?s. (merit 
Pay~ public recognition, promotion) and specific work 
~ctivities? Circle the number from the scale that 
indi~ates the importance of these activiti~s ~o 
receiving the specified reward, not as you think it 
~hou~d be, but as you perceive the situatio~ at your 
institution. For example, if you feel there is a very st rong relationship between effective teaching and 
;eceiving merit pay (i.e., that effective teaching is 
~ery important' to receiving merit pay), you would 
circle 5 for the first response below; if you think it 
has very little or no importance to your receiving the 
reward, circle 1. 
Use the following scale: 
(very 
unimportant) (very 1------2------3------4------5 important) 
neither/important 
nor unimportant 
a . PubJ.ic Recognition* 
Effective teaching 1 2 3 4 5 
Scholarly publication 1 2 3 4 5 
Receipt of external funds 1 2 3 4 5 
Service on campus conunittee 1 2 3 4 5 
Service to profession 1 2 3 4 5 
Public service 1 2 3 4 5 
* Includes formal recognition by the institution in the form of 
certificates p bl· . 
d , u .1.c announcements of achievements, non-monetary 
a war. s of commendation for o utstandi ng teaching research and service . , , 
b. Promotion in Rank 
Effective teaching 1 2 3 4 5 Scholarly publication 1 2 3 4 5 Receipt of external funds 1 2 3 4 5 Service on campus conunittee 1 2 3 4 5 Service to profession 1 2 3 4 5 Public service 
1 2 3 4 5 
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2 . Circ l e t he number on the continuum that corresponds 
t o the a v e r age number of hours per week you are fully 
e ngaged i n y our professional work. Include all aspects 
o f y o u r job including teaching and research 
activities, c a~pus and professional service, and grant 
a ppli c a tions. 
2 5 - --- 3 0---- 35----40----45----50----55----60----65 
o r less or more 
~ · Assume that your institution will reward salary 
inc reases f o r meritorious performance. Consider each 
size reward l i sted below . How many~ hours (if any) 
would you be willing to work to earn each? For 
e xample, in t he first case, how many more hours would 
you be willing to work (from O to more than 10 
':1ddi tional hours per week) for a 5% merit salary 
i n c rease? (Circle a number on the continuum for each 
award level. ) 
5% Merit Increase: o-----2-----4-----6-----8----->10 
Additional hours per week 
10% Merit Increase : o-----2-----4-----6-----8----->10 
Additional hours per week 
15% Merit Increase: o-----2-----4-----6-----8----->10 
Additional hours per week 
One- time bonus equal to 5% of your current salary: 
0-----2-----4-----6-----a----->10 
Additional hours per week 
4 . Distribute 100 points among the activities listed 
below to reflect the proportion of your time you 
devoted to each during the past year. 
Teaching, preparing for class, advising students 
Research, writing articles / books/conference 
presentations , grant proposals 
Campus/Community Service, time spent preparing 
and serving on committees 
Service to profession or discipline 
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5. (a) Assume that the pool of merit pay at your 
institution were earmarked for distinguished 
performance in teaching related activities. How 
would it affect your level of effort? Would your 
effort in teaching activities increase or remain 
unchanged under each of the reward levels below? 
Respond for each reward level by circling a number on 
the continuums based on the following scale: 
l-----------2-----------3-----------4-----------5 
no more somewhat significantly 
effort more effort more effort 
5% Merit l--------2--------3--------4--------s 
10% Merit 1--------2--------3--------4--------s 
15% Merit l--------2--------3--------4--------s 
One-time bonus l--------2--------3--------4--------s 
(5% of sal.ary} 
~b} . As.sume that the pool of merit p.ay at your 
institution were earmarked for distinguished 
performance in research activities. How would it affect 
your level of effort in research activities? Respond 
for each reward level using the continuum scale used · 





(5% of aal.ary} 
1--------2--------3--------4--------s 
1--------2--------3------- 4 - --------5 
1--------2--------3--------4 ________ 5 
1--------2--------3--- 4 ----- --------5 
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(c) Assume that the pool of merit pay at your 
institution were earmarked for disti~g~i~hed 
performance in campus and community service a?tiviti~s · 
How would it affect your level of effort in ~ervice 
activities? Respond for each reward level using the 
continuum scale used in 6(a). 
5% Merit 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
10% Merit 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
15% Merit 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
One-time bonus 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(5% of salary) 
(d) Assume that the pool of merit pay at your 
institution were earmarked for distinguished 
performance in service to one's profession or 
~iscipline. How would it affect your level of effort 
in service to your profession? Respond for each reward 
level using the continuum scale used in 6(a). 
5% Merit 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
10% Merit 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
15% Merit 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
One-time bonus 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(5% of sa.lary) 
Demographic Information 
What is your rank? Assistant Associate Full 
Do you have tenure? Yes __ How long?_years No 
What is your age? <30 30-39 40-49 50-60 >60 
~ow many years have you been at your present 
institution?_years 
How many years have you been a college/university 
faculty member? ___ years 
What is your field or discipline? 
------------What is your current salary level? <$30,000 
$30,000-49,000 $50 000-69 000 --
> $100, 000 - , , __ $70, 000-100, ooo __ 
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QUESTIONNAIRE TO CHIEF ACADEMIC OFFICERS 
AT MERIT PAY INSTITUTIONS 
FACULTY PAY PLAN PROFILE 
To the Chief Academic Officer: 
The following questions regarding you~ ins~itutio~'s 
merit pay plan supplements the quest1.onna1.res being 
completed by some of the faculty. Please take a few 
minutes to answer the following questions and return 
this form in the attached stamped envelope. Your 
responses will be kept confidential and particular 
institutional policies will not be identified. 
Thank you for participating in this study. 
1. Was a cost of living (COLA) increase provided to 
faculty last year (1990-91)? Yes __ No __ 
If yes, what was the percentage increase? __ % 
2. What percentage of full-time faculty received merit 
pay in 1990-91? % 
3. What was the average merit pay above COLA in 1990-
91 (%)? __ % 
4. 
5. 
What was the highest merit raise awarded? 
What was the lowest merit raise awarded? 
% 
% 
6 · . How many years has this merit pay plan been in 
existence? ___ years 
? · What is the disclosure policy for merit awards? 
i.e., are award sizes and recipients of merit raises 
made public? (check all that apply) 
___ Names of individuals who received merit 
pay and the size of merit awards are not 
publicly disclosed 
Names of merit award recipients are 
made public 
_ Size of merit awards are made public 
The kinds of achievement that produced 
merit awards is made public 
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8. Who determines the criteria used in evaluating 







9. Are there formally defined categories of 




Are faculty members informed of these categories and 
t heir meaning? 
Yes 
No 
10 . Who determines who will receive merit pay? 
11 . Is there a maximum percentage of faculty who may 
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